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Abstract
In chaotic maintenance environments, executing planned maintenance becomes
diﬃcult because the need for immediate corrective action escalates. Reverting
back from a poor system state to a stable and well maintained one is a chal-
lenge. Railway track environments are prone to system degradation and poor
maintenance. They are, therefore, in need of analytical tools to `get on track'
with maintenance.
A risk-based method which grades track corridors between train stations
according to their level of risk was developed. To achieve this, both the like-
lihood and the severity components of risk were considered. The likelihood
component of risk in the track environment is the reliability of track. Reliabil-
ity was calculated by quantifying track failure modes ﬁrst and then analysing
the characteristics of failures for each track corridor. Probabilistic models
were generated from repairable systems reliability theory from which reliabil-
ity predictions were made. The severity component of risk is the average delay
historically experienced by each track corridor. A risk matrix was developed
which brings together likelihood and severity components of risk for each track
corridor. Maintenance prioritisation is possible from the risk rankings created
by the matrix. The risk rankings for ﬁve track corridors were validated when
a condition-based track maintenance tool, TQI, was in agreement.
ii
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Uittreksel
In die chaotiese instandhoudingsomgewing is dit moeilik om beplande onder-
houd uit te voer, aangesien die nodigheid vir onmiddellike regstellende aksie
toeneem. Om terug te keer van 'n swak stelsel na 'n stabiele en goed in-
standgehoue stelsel is 'n uitdaging. Spoorweg-omgewings is geneig tot stelsel-
agteruitgang en swak instandhouding. Daar is dus 'n behoefte aan analitiese
metodes om weer op die regte skedule te begin volg met instandhouding.
'n Risiko-gebaseerde metode wat spoorweë tussen stasies gradeer volgens
hulle risiko is ontwikkel. Om dit reg te kry, is beide die waarskynlikheid en die
graad van erns van risiko's in ag geneem. Die waarskynlikheid van risiko in
die spoor-omgewing is die betroubaarheid van die spoor. Betroubaarheid word
bereken deur eerstens die hoeveelheid spoorfalings te bepaal en dan die ken-
merke van die falings vir elke spoorweg te analiseer. Waarskynlikheidsmodelle
is opgestel van herstelbare stelsels betroubaarheidsteorie van waar betroubaar-
heidsvoorspellings gemaak is. Die graad van erns van risiko's is die gemiddelde
vertraging wat histories deur elke spoorweg ondervind is. 'n Risiko-matriks wat
die waarskynlikheid en graad van erns van risiko's kombineer is vir elke spoor-
weg ontwikkel. Instandhoudings-prioritisering word moontlik gemaak deur
die risiko-graderings volgens die matriks. Die risiko-graderings vir vyf-spoor
spoorweë is bevestig toe 'n voorwaarde-gebaseerde instandhoudingsprogram,
TQI, eenparigheid bereik het.
iii
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The passenger railway industry in developed countries around the world sets
a standard of performance and service reliability for developing countries to
follow. Railway companies in developing countries are the `baby children' of
the railway giants of today - French ProRail, American Amtrak and German
Deutsche Bahn, to name a few. The reputation of today's big names was
not established without conquering major problems. It is important that rail-
way companies in developing countries focus on mitigating key problems that
cause the loss of company momentum rather than attempting to solve all the
problems, at once. (Maluleke, 2013). Railway companies in developing coun-
tries lack the practical tools to mitigate key problems, which causes a chaotic
maintenance environment where faults are not managed eﬀectively. A prac-
tical tool needs to be developed to solve engineering maintenance problems
through maintenance prioritisation. Solving high risk problems ﬁrst is a sure
way to improve the state of systems in an environment where not all planned
maintenance will be executed.
One of the most complex maintenance environments in a typical railway
company is railway perway, which struggles to recover from a sick asset ﬂeet.
Perway refers to a section of railway track. Database asset management soft-
ware currently exists in many developing railway companies to manage per-
way, although valuable on-hand data is not well utilised. Maintenance man-
agers need to be able to visualise and prioritise maintenance in order to get a
start on a functional preventative maintenance strategy in this environment.
Adding to the grass roots maintenance problem, many decision makers for
perway don't have a powerful engineering skill set to exploit trends discovered
from available data. Fogel (2013) touches on the solution to these problems
when he speaks about improved risk performance through eﬀective asset man-
agement. Eﬀective asset management is possible when decision makers have
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
practical tools enabling them to heal their sick ﬂeet, with only experience at
their ﬁnger tips.
1.2 Problem statement
On account of the above background, there are no tools that quantify the risk
and reliability of a section of perway for the sake of maintenance prioritisation
in the South African passenger railway industry. The problem is relevant be-
cause railway perway is always degrading over time due to train traﬃc loads.
The objective of perway maintenance is to increase the reliability and availabil-
ity of the perway, and improve the safety of passengers in accordance with the
RAMS (reliability, availability, maintenance and safety) philosophy. Without
reliable perway for trains to pass over, the railway network operations team
is unable to schedule train passage eﬀectively as there is remarkable uncer-
tainty about the integrity of perway. Perway reliability needs to be at a high
standard and this is only achieved through maintenance. Every engineering
asset cannot be maintained to perfect standard due to cost and workforce lim-
itations, which is why a strategic maintenance strategy is necessary to ensure
high reliability standards for South African passenger rail.
1.3 Research objectives
The set research objectives are chronologically listed milestones leading to the
primary objective, which is a reliability-based risk model. The objectives are
listed as follows:
 To construct a reliability model representing the probability of successful
operation of the train service from the perspective of a section of perway
and populate the model using quantitative statistical failure data.
 To create a reliability-based risk model that compares the risk of severe
service-stopping failures of diﬀerent perway sections for the purpose of
perway section maintenance prioritisation.
 To validate the developed reliability-based risk model by comparing it to
an appropriate condition-based tool currently used to make maintenance
decisions.
During the research process, milestones were set. These involved deadlines
for surveys, interviews, data capturing, data cleaning, review of literature and
actual data analysis. The crux of actual research work was reviewing of liter-
ature.
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1.4 Research design and methodology
In this section, the methodology presented in Fig. 1.1 is discussed in detail.
The research methodology seeks to merge avenues of research pertaining to
statistics and asset management. The statistical avenue is mainly concerned
with reliability analysis of perway corridors, which is boxed in Fig. 1.1 as
the likelihood arm of a risk matrix. The asset management avenue is mainly
concerned with the identiﬁcation of perway failure modes and the calculation
of average delay for each perway corridor. This avenue is dubbed severity in
the ﬁgure for its contribution to a risk matrix model. A risk metric is to be
computed for each perway corridor as the output of severity and likelihood
calculations. The two avenues overlap because failure modes identiﬁcation
is necessary for the analysis of statistical reliability. The limitation of this
methodology is that it applies to a speciﬁc case, namely the Passenger Rail-
way Agency of South Africa (PRASA). This methodology was developed for
PRASA to improve decision making by their maintenance engineers. As a re-
sult, data and available information was extracted from PRASA, therefore the
results arising from the methodology can best be applied within this speciﬁc
company.
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Figure 1.1: Research methodology for the development and validation of a
reliability-based risk perway section maintenance prioritisation model.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The purpose of the literature analysis is to discover the best techniques avail-
able to satisfy the primary objectives. The literature is divided into sections of
which each contributed to the completion of the steps in the research method-
ology. The review starts with a general outlook at the given industry. It then
focuses on supporting methods in order to generate the primary reliability
model. The statistical basis of the reliability model is discussed afterwards
and, ﬁnally, the sections are brought together to discuss risk analysis.
2.1 Infrastructure
The infrastructure functional division in a passenger railway company is in-
terested in a high level of preventative maintenance necessary to ensure safe
operation of trains. Preventative maintenance in this context is maintenance
scheduled during oﬀ-peak operating hours. In comparison, corrective mainte-
nance is the repair of sudden component failures, which often delays the train
service. Infrastructure has a responsibility towards the operations department,
which explains the importance of understanding the eﬀect of these departments
on each other. The operations division of a railway service company encom-
passes scheduling, managing capacity and measuring the performance of the
systems in operation. Infrastructure and operations divisions aﬀect each other
when infrastructure faults cause delays and speed restrictions. Maintenance
of infrastructure can interfere with the operations schedule of running trains,
which has an opportunity cost related to under-utilised railway assets. In a
similar way, capacity issues in a train network puts pressure on infrastructure
to expand existing traﬃc routes. Performance indicators developed to monitor
rail network operations performance could be better utilised for infrastructure
management and is therefore of research interest.
5
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2.1.1 Railway track maintenance strategy
The established method for large scale railway track maintenance in South
Africa is condition-based maintenance, using a track geometry correcting rail
car (Zaayman, 2011). This sophisticated IM2000 track car is driven along a cir-
cuit to determine poor sections of track by optical measurement and statistical
analysis. Standard deviation of track geometries from the design conditions
are used to construct a Track Quality Index (TQI). Poor track sections are
thus separated from good track sections which results in a maintenance sched-
ule. In addition to this, planned maintenance is conducted using inspection
trolleys. Perway incidents are reported to track inspectors who send out main-
tenance teams to conduct corrective maintenance.
Minsili et al. (2012) are interested in the main causes of railway track ge-
ometry deterioration and derailment. In Cameroon, this is caused by ballast
degradation. They have focused on preventative maintenance by acknowledg-
ing their number one failure cause. They developed a ballast renewal strategy
which allows for improved long-term health of the track network, using FEM
and a ballast inspection method which grades ballast by a deterioration index.
The eﬀectiveness of this method could pave the way to a movement in the
direction of preventative maintenance for rail track and mapping of railway
assets. Oyama and Miwa (2006) realised the potential for improvement of
maintenance scheduling from a disorganised schedule to a schedule following
an optimal route. Their degradation and restoration model makes it possible
to know where and when maintenance is necessary. Equipped with this infor-
mation, an all-integer linear programming model (AILP) was used to optimise
the route of a multiple tie tamper (MTT), which is a perway maintenance ma-
chine. Cost was one of the decision variables in the problem. Higgins (1998)
considered a train operations schedule and minimised the number of times
that scheduled maintenance should clash with train operation. A tabu local
search optimisation method was used to process the large amount of decision
variables in the problem. This shows that track maintenance not only needs to
have optimal routes for maintenance but also speciﬁc times for maintenance, in
accordance with a train operating schedule. An 8% reduction in interference
delay was achieved on a train schedule and 7% in maintenance completion
times.
Currently used railway maintenance methods, in South Africa, require im-
provement and new technology. Researchers are interested in new preventa-
tive maintenance methods that eliminate wasted cost spent maintaining assets
that are not critical to the success of network operation. Track geometry and
ballast renewal are highlighted due to their capacity to eliminate perway fail-
ures through intelligent maintenance. New technologies for ballast and track
renewal are evolving from this concern. Although preventative maintenance
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seems like the answer, improved maintenance activities are not the complete
answer to improved maintenance. This is because the scheduling of mainte-
nance is equally critical to the success of a maintenance strategy as Oyama and
Miwa (2006) verify. If the maintenance strategy prevents unplanned corrective
maintenance then operations will incur less schedule interference, in addition
to the successes experienced by maintenance departments. Railway perway
maintenance contains age-based replacement, condition-based perway renewal
and preventative maintenance through regular inspections and repairs.
2.1.2 Delays and speed restrictions
The press in South Africa reported that the Railway Safety Regulator issued a
warning and improvement target to Metrorail Western Cape, in March 2014,
about infrastructure safety compliance (Regulator, 2014). Speed restrictions of
15km/h were imposed on lines outside the Belville and the Cape Town stations
as the infrastructure was declared to be in an unsafe condition. In 2014, the
UK's Network Rail under-spent ¿1.2bn on maintenance (Topham, 2014). In-
frastructure faults caused a 1-5% increase in missed punctuality targets. This
increase in delays was the reason behind a ¿53 million ﬁne by the Oﬃce of Rail
Regulation. Sudden failures cause a disruption to regular service as trains are
often delayed while faults are being ﬁxed, which is the case for Network Rail.
Another study by Börjesson and Eliasson (2011) shows that passengers care
more about the length of delay and the risk of delay than the average time
that trains are delayed. This is mainly due to the railway servicing business
routes where time eﬃciency is paramount. Longer delays are mostly caused
by unexpected infrastructure failures. Thus, it is diﬃcult to make quick oper-
ational adjustments where no transfer options exist for passengers.
From the discussion, one ﬁnds that infrastructure maintenance and opera-
tions are linked through the delays and speed restrictions, which cause unre-
liability in the railway service. These negative eﬀects on operations could be
better controlled with perway maintenance tasks that improve the reliability
of the larger system.
2.1.3 Capacity problems
Railway infrastructure is linked directly to the capacity of a rail network, which
is governed by the size of the locomotive ﬂeet, the extent of infrastructural
development and train scheduling. During peak hours for a passenger train
company, more trains will be in service than any other time and infrastructure
failures could have an eﬀect on train delays across the ﬂeet. Shcherbanin (2012)
investigated Russia's railway problems and highlighted capacity bottlenecks as
one of the most signiﬁcant problems. In a similar context, PRASA has single-
carriageway train tracks between Stellenbosch and Cape Town, which causes
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major delays in the event of a track failure. From these practical problems, a
conclusion is drawn that high traﬃc single-carriageway tracks have to be main-
tained at a higher standard, with a higher reliability than other track sections.
Gevert (2007), another researcher, encountered capacity issues that led to the
expansion of Brazil's Carajas Railway. Solution methods included doubling
up carriageways, at a huge capital expense and increasing train length. Often
low-cost strategic solutions are overlooked and instead, solutions to increase
capacity involve large infrastructure capital expenditure.
Infrastructure research should enable a higher standard of track mainte-
nance at a lower cost, thus alleviating capacity issues by a quantiﬁable amount.
In this way, trains will be able to travel faster and more safely. The inhibitor
of such methods is the poof of their success as they encapsulate a high risk
and a high reward scenario.
2.1.4 KPIs
Key performance indicators (KPIs) are often used in the railway operations
division to track speciﬁc areas of performance and to compare and improve
progress. This tool has been applied to infrastructure maintenance and in-
frastructure assets but the tool lacks traction to stimulate cultural changes in
organisations such as PRASA.
Åhrén (2005) provided a deﬁnition of a key performance indicator. A
`performance indicator' is a measure capable of generating a quantiﬁed value to
indicate the level of performance taking into account single or multiple aspects'.
During the day-to-day management of a maintenance environment for railway
infrastructure, these performance indicators can be used as a guide-line to
ensure that valuable improvements are being made. Banverket (Swedish rail)
used maintenance performance indicators (MPIs) that aﬀect infrastructure,
namely, train delays due to infrastructure, number of train disruptions due
to infrastructure, capacity restrictions, markdowns in current standard (speed
restrictions), total number of urgent inspection remarks and track quality index
(Åhrén, 2005). These indicators are a guideline for research on improvement
areas of infrastructure. Stenstrom et al. (2013) used a link and eﬀect model to
convert railway business objectives in to KPIs that were then used in a case
study. This model was ﬁnally implemented at the Iron Ore line in Sweden as
a standard company tool. This method allows for useful captured data to be
converted into change management. The case study presented is a testimony to
the success of KPI implementation in a maintenance environment, especially
by engineering managers who are able to encourage buy-in from employees
that is enough to initiate cultural change.
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2.1.5 Safety
Infrastructure failures have a safety impact on train passengers, the most se-
vere of these failures being train derailment. Infrastructure failures have an
eﬀect that extends beyond the consumer, causing injury to company workers
as well as motor vehicle users who interact with the rail system. Financial
statements of established railway companies declare safety as one of their key
performance areas. Although safety can be interpreted as crime related, the
same threat to life applies in an accident scenario. This shows that the rep-
utation of a company according to both the customer and employees is a big
part of company success.
Evans (2011) conducted an investigation of fatal train incidents in Europe
between 1980 and 2009. Infrastructure was the second highest cause of colli-
sion for seven out of nine countries and it was the fourth highest cause for two
of the countries. There were a total of 277 fatal train collisions during this
period. Kyriakidis et al. (2012) identiﬁed infrastructure technical failures as a
key precursor to railway accidents. They developed a methodology which elim-
inates accident precursors for the sake of prevention. This methodology was
applied to eighteen major metro's that have emerged in the last decade. To
mitigate precursors and reduce accident risk, it was decided that investments
in infrastructure would be an important solution. Reliability improvement of
railway was listed as another pro-active solution in the infrastructure domain.
American rail incidents and deaths were investigated by Liu et al. (2011), who
focused on perway failures. The number one cause of derailment was broken
welds and rail sections, followed by track geometry defects. These failures
modes disrupt operations as well as present safety hazards and cost compli-
cations to infrastructure maintenance. Infrastructure failures caused more
derailments than rolling stock, indicating that infrastructure health is a high
safety priority for railway companies. It was proven through statistical analy-
sis that derailment risk decreases as the condition of the track improves. This
is an important discovery, which indicates that there is a relationship between
probability of failure and track condition. This opens up an avenue of research
for railway infrastructure management that could see better established links
between track condition and track reliability.
Safety in the railway environment has a strong connection to the way tracks
are maintained. Indeed, a car without a road has a safety problem but the con-
cept can now be understood in terms of railway environment. Track condition
and certain modes of degradation increase safety concern and with thorough
research, these problems can be better mitigated and controlled.
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Figure 2.1: Simpliﬁed rail proﬁle for a section of perway.
2.2 Reliability of perway components
According to (Modarres et al., 2009), `reliability is the ability of an item (com-
ponent or system) to operate under designated operating conditions for a spec-
iﬁed period of time or a number of cycles. The ability of an item can be under-
stood through probabilistic or deterministic methods'. In this way, reliability
can be quantiﬁed at a component level or an asset level. The component level
is addressed in this section. The deﬁnition of reliability can be applied to each
component of the perway to ensure that it is reliability that is actually being
measured. Often indexing methods or condition-based methods lack the prob-
ability of failure aspect that is an important part of the reliability deﬁnition.
Deterministic approaches are better used when statistical data is not available.
The deﬁnition is broken-up so that the reader can understand what is being





It is pertinent to give a deﬁnition of perway as this is the primary unit of
discussion for the research. A section of track is called `perway' for the purposes
of this investigation. Perway is deﬁned as a collection of track components:
ballast, sleeper, rail pad, rail clip and the rail itself. Fig. 2.1 presents a section
of perway. All perway failure modes except block joint faults (signalling) exist
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Figure 2.2: Risk of a defect type developing into a rail break for progressive age of
rail (Kumar et al., 2010).
due to their danger towards train derailment. Often with these failure modes,
the train can still pass but the risk of derailment is so severe that the system
is considered to be in a failed state. As such, probability of derailment is used
as a benchmark for reliability. In literature, probability of derailment due to
speciﬁc track component failures can be quantiﬁed. Keeping in mind what has
been said about derailment probability, reliability for certain individual track
components can be calculated statistically as well as the discussed estimation
from derailment conditions.
2.2.1 Reliability of rail
Kumar et al. (2010) created a risk measure for rail fracture to determine the
best time for diﬀerent kinds of maintenance during the life cycle of a rail. Rails
of the same failure code were grouped together and failures were recorded from
time of installation. The risk measure is made up of a probability of occurrence
component and a severity component, which was determined by experts. The
probability of occurrence component is determined by assuming a repairable
system and analysing the failure data, thus generating reliability measures per
failure mode. Fig. 2.2 presents the risk measure for diﬀerent failures codes as
the rail progresses in age.
2.2.2 Reliability of sleeper
Zhao et al. (2007) discuss reliability analysis for railway sleepers using a fail-
ure model. They developed a reliability model for a cluster of sleepers with
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consecutive failed sleepers, using k-out-of-n principles. The failure mode for a
sleeper considered here is related to cracks, broken-oﬀ chunks, rail seat damage
or complete fracture. A Weibull distribution is an exemplar statistical model
to describe the distribution of sleeper failures. The reliability of an individual
sleeper at time t is presented (Zhao et al. 2007, eqn. 2.1).
R(t) = e−λ(t/η)
β
, λ, β > 0 (2.1)
Where β and η are shape and scale parameters respectively. These pa-
rameters are determined by the maximum likelihood parameter estimation
technique. The reliability, R(To + τ), of a single sleeper at time t0 + τ and its
probability of failure, f(To + τ), given that it is functional after inspection at
time t0 may be given by
R(To + τ) = R(To + τ)/R(To)
f(To + τ) = [R(To)−R(To + τ)]/R(To)
The above set of equations allows a sleeper reliability prediction for a future
time. The further in time the model extends, the more inaccurate it becomes,
which explains why discretion is advised. It is further noted that the eﬀect of
the rail, rail pad and ballast condition on sleeper reliability has been accounted
for by the nature of these components interacting with a sleeper, adding to the
cause of failure. The impact of these components is assumed to be random.
2.2.3 Reliability of ballast
Nurmikolu (2012) conducted condition assessment of ballast and substructure
and identiﬁed GPR (Ground Penetrating Radar) as a real-time tool to monitor
ballast condition. From this research, a failure mode for ballast is determined
and over time, a statistical basis can be developed for ballast failure. Ballast
failure is the percentage ballast material that passes through a speciﬁc sieve
opening size that is more than speciﬁcation, according to track maintenance
personnel. Silvast et al. (2010) created a GPR fouling index for ﬁve meter
track sections based on real-time signal data. The index data for ﬁve meter
sections can be averaged over 200 meters, in-line with the reliability model.
A reliability value in the time domain is generated for this data by ﬁtting
observed failures to a known distribution. Nurmikolu (2012) suggests taking
samples from beneath the sleeper edges as this is where degradation is most
concentrated, providing a conservative reliability estimate. In other words,
more failures will occur in the model than in reality. Sadeghi and Askarinejad
(2011) give equal weighting between rail, sleeper, rail clip and ballast struc-
tural condition for maintenance, thus in a reliability block diagram, the ballast
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reliability measure satisﬁes equality. Prescott and Andrews (2013) use Petri
Net modelling to capture the eﬀect of ballast maintenance on rail geometric
parameters. They stipulate that based on track geometry measures, ballast
maintenance is conducted. This method is interesting because it seeks to pre-
vent the cause of failure, rather than patch up the problem. Al-Qadi et al.
(2008) use GPR methods to detect ballast fouling, which solidiﬁes the notion
that GPR is the future technology for ballast maintenance.
2.2.4 Reliability of rail pad
Rail pad failure cannot directly cause system failure but it can be a contributor
lending to system failure. As a train drives over the track, rail clips deﬂect
due to vertical forces and rail pads provide damping to mitigate the severity
of cyclic loading on the rail clips. Rail pad failure can be characterised as the
deterioration of dynamic characteristics below the design speciﬁcation. This
wear and tear can be attributed to fatigue which increases with number of
train load cycles. Remennikov et al. (2006) test the dynamic characteristics
(stiﬀness and damping) of rail pads in a laboratory environment using a direct
testing method. During the tests, ton hours of loading were increased and
samples were extracted from the loading chamber at diﬀerent time intervals.
For passenger rail, it would be more beneﬁcial to measure installed hours rather
than ton hours for a reliability model as passenger rail load varies according
to passenger load, unlike freight rail. Spot tests of rail pads would need to
take place at each break section to account for the eﬀect of local conditions on
the deterioration of dynamic properties. Infrastructure databases will have the
installation time for each rail pad and the lifetimes could be calculated from
this. Woo and Park (2014) used an accelerated loading method to evaluate the
change in rail pad properties. Heat cycles were applied to the rail pads with 0 ∼
95kN loadings. Rail pad thicknesses decreased with increasing load frequency
and pad displacement increased for a speciﬁc load case. The elasticity of the
pads increased when heat was applied. Arrhenius curves were ﬁt to dynamic
load data to estimate trends for rail pad degradation with time. Although
this method has validity, the real test case as presented by Remennikov et al.
(2006) is preferred over the theoretical model (Woo and Park, 2014).
2.2.5 Reliability of rail clip
The reliability of an individual rail clip is calculated by its ability to sustain
operation according to design speciﬁcation. The failure mode of an individual
clip would be fracture, absence of the clip from its installed position or the de-
terioration of the dynamic properties. The choice of the selected failure mode
is further solidiﬁed by Prasad (2012), who show failure modes for the South
African Pandrol e-clip under simulated load cases. For simplicity, it is better
to declare a clip as either 100% reliable or totally unreliable. In this way, it
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would be easier to track and process it on a system level. In contest to the
chosen method, Mohammadzadeh et al. (2014) pose a fatigue life reliability
method for the determination of individual rail clip reliability. This method
applies rain-ﬂow method and Palmgren-Miner linear damage rule for crack
nucleation life and Monte Carlo simulation for a ﬁrst order reliability method
estimation. The approach by Mohammadzadeh is weakened as this method
cannot be easily reciprocated on a real-life, large scale system.
Failures must be categorised as belonging to a straight track (tangent track)
or curved track as rail clips in each of these sections experience diﬀerent load-
ing conditions. For a tangent track, train speeds are higher than curved tracks
and tangent tracks do not experience horizontal force variations as signiﬁcant
as those on curved tracks. Rail clips on curves are expected to receive more
wear-and-tear than those on tangent tracks. Marquis et al. (2011) state that
inward cant angles like those of a curved track are more likely to fail derail-
ment criteria than the zero cant of straight sections. This is due to the fact
that the derailment coeﬃcient for an inward cant curved section is higher. A
distribution such as Weibull is used to determine the reliability of clip failures
where an individual clip socket is monitored for failure.
2.2.6 Reliability block diagram
The reliability analysis on individual components is extended to account for
the eﬀect of multiple failures in combination on the whole break section. The
reliability block diagram (RBD) of a section of perway comprises a logic net-
work of components of which each has its own reliability. If a component
fails (reliability zero), the system fails. The rail clip and sleeper blocks in
the diagram have multiple modes of operation. These changing modes will
have an eﬀect on reliability at system level. Rail pad and ballast systems are
non-critical to system failure and therefore are considered separately. It is
still useful to keep track of the reliability of these components so they can be
prioritised for maintenance separately. The critical system is presented in Fig.
2.3. Note that because the model consists of series connections, there is no
redundancy in the model (back-ups if components fail). In railway systems,
redundancy is achieved through additional structural support such as railway
sleepers. If any of the sub-blocks in the RBD fails, then a train will not be
able to safely pass over the tracks and the entire perway system will fail.
2.2.7 Reliability of a set of rails
The reliability of a set of rails on a railway track is quantiﬁed using the deﬁni-
tion check list. The failure mode of the set of rails is the condition of the pair
such that derailment will occur with 100% probability, according to theoretical
principles. Although this does not cover every possible failure mode of track,
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Figure 2.3: Reliability block diagram for a 200 meter section of perway.
it does cover more severe failure modes in terms of service disruption, as a ﬁrst
approximation of perway reliability. The time component is the design life of
the rail and the operating conditions are those speciﬁed by a local railway
operator. The probability of derailment, Pf due to rail geometric irregularities
and rail proﬁle wear are the components of rail reliability. These two factors
are precursors to rail cracking and fracture. The self-explanatory equation
(2.2) quantiﬁes the reliability of the rail pair based on series reliability system
theory. This equation is an initial estimate of the rail set system reliability.
Note that a break length of 200 meters is considered for reliability calculations.
Rrailset = (1− Pfgeom)(1− Pfprofile) (2.2)
Mohammadzadeh et al. (2011) used ﬁve geometric input parameters with
random values to determine derailment probability from track geometric ir-
regularities using a Monte Carlo simulation method. The Nadal criterion
for derailment was considered in the formulation of the probability of fail-
ure. Nadal developed a derailment coeﬃcient limit, L/V , which is a limit on
the lateral over the horizontal forces experienced by a train wheel in operation.
The equation used to calculate derailment probability is described (Moham-


















Where: hv(ϑi) is the joint probability function of density sampling. fx(ϑi)
is the main joint density function of random variable. N is the total number
of tests for Monte Carlo analysis. I(ϑi) is the indicator function with a value
of one if x is located in the failure region and zero if x is located in the safe
region. Further detail on the ﬁrst term of the above equation is described in
the literature. The described methodology can thus be followed to determine
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probability of failure based on track irregularity parameters. An input mea-
surement from a recording rail car is necessary to use this method. The ﬁnal
step is the application of probability equation (2.3). The eﬀect of non-critical
perway components (rail pad failure and ballast distribution) on the probabil-
ity of failure due to geometric input parameters is random and thus will not
skew the calculation of Rrailset.
Mohammadzadeh and Ghahremani (2012) use another approach to incor-
porate the eﬀect of rail proﬁle wear on probability of derailment. As a rail
proﬁle deteriorates, a train wheel glides up the rail to an unstable position
such that an impact on the wheel can cause the train to jump from the tracks.
A track recording car is used to measure the rail proﬁle parameters using a
non-contact, optical method. Van der Merwe and Venter (2001) conﬁrm the
performance capabilities of the IM2000 rail car used by PRASA. The method-
ology for the calculation of probability of derailment due to rail proﬁle wear is
presented in Fig. 2.4. Further detail on the method and parameter deﬁnitions
are presented in the literature.
2.2.8 Reliability of the sleeper system
Immediate sleeper system failure is when two consecutive sleepers fail, causing
a service disruption. A more common occurring failure is when a threshold
number of individual sleepers fail in a dispersed manner in a small section of
perway. Reliability can be calculated from statistical data for two or more
consecutive failures as well as reliability depending on how many dispersed
failures currently exist in the section. The cluster reliability for four cases of k-
out-of-n sleeper failures is calculated. The cluster reliability includes k = 2 and
k = 3 consecutive sleeper failures that exist between sleeper cluster sections.
Fig. 2.5 presents the series sequence used to calculate sleeper reliability and a
recursive sequence when the system becomes more complex (k = 3).
2.2.9 Reliability of the ballast system
The ballast system is a non-critical component in terms of derailment and
thus it is not presented in Fig. 2.3. The ballast reliability is determined by
the average reliability of a group of samples in a break section. Thus, ballast
reliability at the system level is simply a collection of statistical failure data
from ballast failures at key points along a track section.
2.2.10 Reliability of the rail pad system
The rail pad system is a non-critical system for reliability. To determine rail
pad reliability, the time the rail pads have been installed must be recorded
and compared to dynamic degradation curves generated by Remennikov et al.
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Figure 2.4: Methodology to determine train derailment probability (Moham-
madzadeh and Ghahremani, 2012).
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Figure 2.5: k-out-of-n reliability analysis for k = 2 and k = 3 systems (Zhao et al.,
2007).
(2006). Spot tests should be conducted on rail pads that are removed from each
break section at speciﬁed times after installation to check the eﬀect of local
conditions on the deterioration of the rail pads. Failure records will then be
adjusted according to condition data. This is a reliability estimation method
based on operating conditions. A failure database will be built up using this
method and from this, reliability can be determined.
2.2.11 Reliability of the rail clip system
A train can derail when a number of consecutive rail clips fail. The reliability
of the system will depend on the speciﬁc location of rail clip failure and how
many consecutive clips have failed. Similar to the sleeper system, reliabilities
are averaged over the break section and act as part of the series critical system
of perway. The derailment mechanism that rail clip failure can cause is called
`rolling track failure' (Iwnicki, 2006). This occurs when the vertical and lateral
derailment forces from the rolling stock overcome torsional stiﬀness and rail
clip restraining forces causing the track to pivot on its track side edge. The
failure mode for this phenomenon is presented in Fig. 2.6. The rail rollover
failure mode is further conﬁrmed by Greve et al. (2014). They measure pres-
sure experienced by the rail seat for increasing coeﬃcients of derailment. The
ﬁndings reveal high pressure on the track side of the rail seat with little pres-
sure on the gauge side for high coeﬃcients of derailment. This indicates an
outward rolling moment for the rail. For rail rollover failure modes, the rail
experiences poor resistance to the moment forcing the rail over due to wear
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Figure 2.6: Rail rollover failure mode (Iwnicki, 2006).
and tear, states Marquis et al. (2011). To illustrate the causes of rail rollover,
The researcher developed a simpliﬁed beam model in Fig. 2.7. This ﬁgure
provides support to solidify the argument that consecutive clip failures have
a drastic eﬀect on probability of derailment when compared to dispersed clip
failures.
Figure 2.7: Top view of train loaded rail with rail clip supports.
Fig. 2.7 illustrates that with consecutive failed supports, the rail is more
likely to bend. This bending causes horizontal forces to act at the top end
of the rail, initialising a tipping motion. This argument is supported by the
US Dept. of Transportation (2011) which shows that for three consecutive clip
failures, the gauge widening resistance limit of a track section is exceeded. This
is considered to be a system failure. Research on k-out-of-n sleeper failures by
Zhao et al. (2007) can be used to determine the reliability of a rail clip system.
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Figure 2.8: Moment diagram of rail section with train forces and clip forces
(Iwnicki, 2006).
This research is consistent with observed reliability theory for consecutive k-
out-of-n: F systems (Elsayed, 2012). Six possibilities of failure are considered,
which are presented in Fig. 2.3. Train derailment is most likely for consecutive
failed track and gauge clips, less likely for gauge side consecutive failed clips
and least likely for track side consecutive failed clips. The diﬀerence between
each of these failure modes in terms of applied forces is understood by the
moment equation around the rail edge for rolling rail derailment, equation
(2.4). Fig. 2.8 presents a moment diagram of a rail section under loading
from a train, which relates to equation (2.4). The C variable from the ﬁgure
represents reaction forces from rail clips when loaded by a passing train.
Mo = L
′H − V ′D − CW − CQ (2.4)
L′ = LcosΦ− V sinΦ
V ′ = V cosΦ + LsinΦ
The researcher proposes that a sensitivity analysis for diﬀerent failure
modes be conducted. In other words, the eﬀect of each of the clip forces
on the moment in equation 2.4 must be quantiﬁed by changing one variable
while ﬁxing the rest of the system. The critical moment for rollover is exceeded
when L/V is large and C is zero. From the sensitivity analysis, an estimate
for a coeﬃcient can be determined that will be applied to the reliability for
consecutive track and gauge side failures respectively. The reliability will be
lowest for consecutive track side and gauge side failures, higher for track side
failures and highest for consecutive gauge side failures.
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2.3 Track quality index
Large engineering systems like the railway networks, land to sea material con-
veyor networks and power stations all have something in common. They have
large engineering assets that need to be managed at a system level. Manage-
ment is necessary because these assets are capital intensive and cannot simply
be discarded and replaced when they fail. Scoping in on the perway assets of a
train company, it is perceived that maintenance accounts for a large portion of
the total expenditure in the life of the system (Esveld, 2001). Due to the im-
portance of the infrastructure division of a passenger railway network and the
contribution of maintenance as an operating expense, research into improved
maintenance methods and practical maintenance tools is being undertaken all
the time.
Improved maintenance methods are being researched by PRASA and Tran-
snet, the railway giants of South Africa. PRASA is interested in practical tools
that can improve the reliability of track sections through maintenance. A cur-
rent condition based tool of particular interest is track quality index (TQI).
TQI encourages maintenance to be conducted by priority, which is necessary to
eliminate current maintenance backlogs. TQI grades track sections according
to their track quality, which is calculated as the standard deviation of track
geometry measurements from the design conditions. The researcher has in-
vestigated separate components of railway perway to accurately quantify the
reliability of a section of perway. Now, the researcher understands the condi-
tion of the perway as a whole through TQI.
2.3.1 Track quality index deﬁnition
Track geometry changes over time due to subgrade and ballast shift, failure
of rail clips on the track and rail/wheel contact exerted by the train. This
change in geometry is called track irregularity. Track irregularity is deﬁned by
ﬁve geometry parameters, namely, twist (TWT), track gauge (GAU), super
elevation or cross level (SUP), average vertical alignment (PRA) and average
horizontal alignment (ALA) (Zaayman, 2013). Mean value measurement of
track irregularity is conducted on 200 meter break lengths of track by the
Plasser IM2000 recording car, instituted by Transnet. This car uses optical
measuring techniques to measure geometry deviation data and is presented
in Fig. 2.9. The track irregularity of a break length is quantiﬁed by Track
Quality Index (TQI), which is the sum of standard deviations of the ﬁve track
irregularity parameters. The South African method for TQI, as discussed, is
simple when compared to that in use internationally such as the TGI index
used in India (Sadeghi and Askarinejad, 2010), which has weighted compo-
nents. China's track irregularity system has more considerations than that of
South Africa, with 7 geometric parameters considered (Xu et al., 2011). An
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Figure 2.9: Plasser IM2000 geometry measuring rail car (Zaayman, 2013).
equation was developed for TQI (Xu et al. 2011, eqn. 2.5) which is consistent

















where σi is the standard deviation of measurements of the ith track ir-
regularity parameter at markings in the break length, ci is the average of
measurements of the jth track irregularity parameter, cij is the measurement
of the ith track irregularity parameter at the jth marking in the break length
and n is the number of measured markings in the break length. The higher
the TQI is, the worse the condition of the track becomes. A threshold value of
7.5 exists for high speed passenger lines at PRASA for the purposes of safety.
2.3.2 Using TQI to make maintenance decisions
Classically TQI is used as a prioritisation tool for track lifting, levelling and
tamping. Ideally, railway perway can be explained as an elastic system that
deforms according to large train traﬃc loads and self-corrects. In reality, fa-
tigue causes the deformation of perway until such a point as speed restrictions
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Table 2.1: Key contributors leading to track geometric defects (Sadeghi and
Askarinejad, 2009).
Eﬀect of track structural conditions on
geometry parameters
Rail Sleeper Fastening Ballast
Geometry condition condition condition condition
parameter (%) (%) (%) (%)
Gauge 24 21 45 10
Proﬁle 10 24 18 48
Alignment 16 33 14 37
Twist 6 36 3 55
are imposed on a line for safety control of a deteriorating perway section.
Large machines have been in operation for years which correct the geometry
of a track as close as possible to design conditions. The exercise of lifting,
levelling and tamping is the deconstruction of a perway section, the lifting of
components and the repacking of these components into ballast.
Correcting track geometry through tamping does not necessarily solve track
geometry problems but can sometimes only provide a temporary ﬁx. Sadeghi
and Askarinejad (2009) group track structural components as either belonging
to rail, sleepers, fastenings or ballast in an investigation of the Iranian rail-
way network. According to Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2009), the condition of
each of these four components has varying eﬀects on the standard deviation
of track geometric parameters. Determining the eﬀect of each component on
standard deviation of track geometry will allow better informed maintenance
decisions from data collected by a track recording car. Once the components
were grouped, the defect density of each component type was calculated by
dividing the number of defected two meter track sections by the total number
of sections in a given sample. An overall defect density is calculated, with a
ﬁlter coeﬃcient for severity of defects as either low, moderate or high. Trends
between defect density of components and standard deviation of track geome-
try were plotted for measurement on the same track section. The stronger the
trend, the larger the contribution of the particular component to the geometry
parameter. The trend strength indicator was converted to a percentage scale
and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 2.1. The analysis indi-
cates that track fastener condition is the primary contributor to track gauge
deviation. Rail proﬁle wear is caused by ballast deterioration. Track align-
ment deviates due to sleeper and ballast degradation and track twist, although
weakly correlating to component failure is caused by ballast and sleeper deteri-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 24
oration. The results of the discussed analysis are evidence towards the creation
of a maintenance decision diagram based on track geometric irregularity.
2.3.3 TQI prediction vs reliability prediction
As with reliability, generating TQI's future predictions for the sake of main-
tenance planning is possible. Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2011) developed a
track degradation model which determines how track condition indices change
with time. The TGI (Track Geometric Index) similar to TQI was evaluated
against time, train speed, TSI (Track Structural Index), loading and initial
TGI. During tests on the Iranian rail line, all variables were ﬁxed and only
one of the discussed variables was allowed to change. The model ultimately
produced a graph which presents the relationship between TGI and time. TGI
and TQI have the same inputs but the calculation of each parameter is slightly
diﬀerent. The same methodology to produce this model can be applied to a
South African rail context to produce a model for changes in TQI over time.
An average estimate of TQI for diﬀerent categories of tested track sections
is presented in Fig. 2.10. Note that the decreasing TGI trend (negative) is
opposite from expected when considering TQI. This is because with TGI, the
geometry irregularity parameters are inputted into a function with a negative
exponential before summing together for the TGI. Detailed deﬁnitions can be
reviewed in the literature.
Figure 2.10: Averaged estimate for change in TQI between maintenance intervals
(Sadeghi and Askarinejad, 2011).
Xu et al. (2011) investigated a short-range prediction model for track qual-
ity index. A track irregularity prediction technique, SRPM-TQI was used in
accordance with historical TQI calculated from waveform data. This approach
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applies the least squares estimation method (LSE) to develop a prediction
model for each break length of track. LSE produced errors of less than 8% for
sixty break lengths of track. Abnormal deviations occurred when tamping or
levelling operations were in progress during measurement intervals. Two meth-
ods were discussed to improve least squares predictions when these operations
were in play. Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2010) and Xu et al. (2011) juxtapose
two methods for future TQI prediction. Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2010), on
the one hand, used a scientiﬁc method of physical testing where all variables,
except one, are ﬁxed in such a way that the relationship for changing a single
variable could be determined. Xu et al. (2011), on the other hand, used a
statistical LSE to predict future TQI readings. The method by Sadeghi and
Askarinejad (2010) is more advantageous to calculate future TQI predictions
than that used by Xu et al. (2011). This is explained by the fact that the TQI
prediction method used by Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2010) involves controlled
tests that eliminate outside interference. Although the statistical analysis by
Xu et al. (2011) involves more rigorous techniques, Sadeghi and Askarinejad
(2010) provide a best ﬁt for data from which predictions were made and the
analysis by Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2010) is more comprehensible.
It is suspected that TQI has a relationship with perway reliability as TQI
represents diﬀerent states of the track. It has been uncovered that these states
have threshold values which indicate failure modes for certain values of TQI.
Like reliability, TQI provides a means to maintain the track. Fig. 2.11 presents
how the TQI is broken down into components which are inputs to the probabil-
ity of derailment equations (due to geometric irregularities). Fig. 2.11 proves
that TQI is a function of σi and Pf is a function of σi therefore a relationship
must exist between TQI and Pf .
2.3.4 Further considerations for TQI and perway
reliability
It was uncovered that TQI and perway reliability are related as they both
change according to the same input parameters. As TQI is a linear equation
of standard deviations, it is easy to monitor the eﬀect of changing input pa-
rameters on the TQI output. The change of input parameters on reliability is
not easily determinable due to the dynamic nature of the perway environment.
One can expect that for extremely poor TQI, the reliability of a perway sec-
tion will reﬂect a comparable level of degradation. A reliability block diagram
was developed which enables the calculation of perway reliability. Prioritising
maintenance based on failure statistics is a sure way for maintenance to reduce
the number of track failures. Condition-based maintenance from tools such as
TQI can be coupled with failure statistics to harness the power of reliability
centred maintenance. This combination of methods is imperative for strategic
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Figure 2.11: Relationship between TQI and rail derailment probability due to track
irregularity.
cost management of maintenance and the improvement of safety in the railway
industry.
2.4 Eﬀects and criticality
In order to understand perway failure modes and their eﬀect on the passen-
ger railway service, eﬀects and criticality methods were investigated for their
applicability. Failure modes, eﬀects and criticality analysis (FMECA); pareto
analysis; cause-consequence analysis; hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
and preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) were compared for applicability in de-
termining perway faults and their criticality.
PHA can be compared to HAZOP in that they both place priority on haz-
ards rather than service failure. The most severe kind of hazard is one that
causes death of personnel. The weakness of PHA is that it is accident focused.
The methodology of PHA reveals harm to personnel, without placing prior-
ity on the expected failures of the system. HAZOP identiﬁes deviation from
design operating conditions using `key words', which stimulates creativity in
the team analysing operating hazards. The methodology is not favoured as it
requires a team of experts to identify hazards and the solutions to hazards do
not necessarily solve system failures. A cause-consequence analysis evaluates
each consequence of an undesirable event and evaluates probabilities of each
of these occurrences. This method is thorough but requires the analysis of
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every possible consequence of a fault. The analysis provides insight into the
eﬀect of a fault on other subdivisions in railway but the detail of this analysis
draws away from the primary objective of the investigation. A pareto analysis
captures the maintenance problem of railway perway divisions that are unable
to prioritise high risk events as ﬁrst priority. The downfall of pareto is that
it reduces the failure risk across the perway network and does not necessarily
allow prioritisation of perway section A to perway section B for maintenance.
This is important as maintenance is sectionalised due to the large land area
over which the assets lie. FMECA is the only tool which seems to allow the
identiﬁcation of failure modes that have a criticality that can be compared on
a sectional basis. FMECA is understood in the context of industry to identify
its limitations.
Failure modes, eﬀects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is `an engineering
technique to deﬁne, identify and eliminate system errors from the system de-
sign, process or service before they reach the customer' (Chin et al., 2009).
This technique is adapted as a diagnostic tool to identify railway perway fail-
ures in current operation. The mechanism that conventional FMECA uses
to eliminate system errors is the Risk Priority Number (RPN) method. The
RPN measure is attractive as the researcher has identiﬁed its compatibility
when coupled with reliability, as it reveals a risk ranking of failure modes that
a reliability model is unable to capture. The RPN measure is calculated as
(Chin et al. 2009, eqn. 2.6):
RPN = Or × Sr ×Dr (2.6)
where Or is a factor grading the occurrence of failure, Sr is a factor for
severity of failure and Dr is a factor representing detection of failure. These
factors each have a 1 - 10 scale as stipulated by literature. The RPN method
has been scrutinised in literature for its inability to identify hidden risks. When
comparing two RPN's of the same number, two drastically diﬀerent situations
can be at work (Wang et al., 2009). Chin et al. (2009) used data envelopment
analysis (DEA) to determine risk priority as they do not believe that the
RPN method is accurate enough for an industry wide application. Another ﬁx
for the shortfalls of RPN was realised with the weighted risk priority number
evaluation (Xiao et al., 2011). This method employed a minimum cut set-based
algorithm to generate a new means for FMECA. Further improvements to the
FMECA were realised through fuzzy logic with expert opinion (Xu et al.,
2002). This approach was taken because interdependencies between failure
modes are often diﬃcult to incorporate into FMEA. A similar approach was
taken by Wang et al. (2009) who decided that too many fuzzy decisions were to
be made in FMECA and reducing the number of decisions induced error. An
alternative approach, fuzzy weighted geometric mean, was incorporated into
the FMECA. It is argued that although many improvements have been made
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to FMECA, the application of FMECA determines whether the standard or
an adapted FMECA should be used. A methodology for basic FMECA in
railway perway was developed from understandings gained in literature; this
is presented in Fig. 2.12.
Figure 2.12: Methodology for the construction of FMECA for railway perway.
Irrespective of any scrutiny, FMECA is widely used around the world and
was proven successful in a test of 100 FMECA applications in Japanese in-
dustry (Xu et al., 2002). Standard FMECA has been applied to railway in-
frastructure in Sweden (Morant et al., 2014). Here, FMECA was used as a
decision support tool for maintenance of signalling systems, which is close to
home for perway. The FMECA in this report was built from the standard,
discussed by Wang et al. (2009); considering the adaptation by Sameni (2012).
As FMECA has not been widely utilised in PRASA, the standard FMECA
method is used as a ﬁrst step towards quantifying the reliability of a section
of perway. This being said, the literature provides insight into potential com-
plexities when comparing risk for failure modes. The standard FMECA is
not accurate enough to be the sole indicator of maintenance priority and the
detection measures in RPN may be over-weighted in its application (Sameni,
2012).
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2.5 Root cause analysis
When failure modes are identiﬁed for perway failure, it is beneﬁcial to ask:
`What caused the failures?' This helps in determining which maintenance task
can prevent the failures from occurring, which reduces the necessary amount of
corrective maintenance. Root cause analysis methods were investigated to de-
termine which methods would be relevant: Fault tree analysis (FTA), Ishikawa
(ﬁshbone diagram), the Five Whys, causal factor charting or root cause map-
ping. The Ishikawa diagram is a method designed to link cause and eﬀects
together. It is useful when a dominant negative eﬀect exists which needs to
be reduced. The limitation of this is if the eﬀect itself cannot be easily traced
to the root of a problem. For example, perway maintenance is concerned with
service disruption thus if train delay is the eﬀect then it would be impossi-
ble to identify all relevant faults through brainstorming. It is better to ﬁrst
identify failure modes from which problems or root causes can be identiﬁed.
The Five Whys method adapted from six sigma is applicable to simple cases
such as human error. It is not extensive enough to cover causes of faults as
experienced in railway perway. Casual factor charting, root cause mapping
and FTA all have a common thread in that they consider a sequence of events
that lead to a failure. Casual factor charting is separated from the others in
that it doesn't necessarily lead to root causes. It simply identiﬁes conditions
that were critical to the occurrence of a failure. The limitation of this method
is that it does not apply well to failures with multiple possible combinatorial
causes as encountered in railway perway. Root cause mapping is similar to
FTA except that it doesn't rely on logic but rather on collected evidence from
each potential cause of the failure. This method is more practical where ﬁeld
work is being conducted. A researcher can use FTA from a theoretical stand-
ing to investigate possible faults of pre-identiﬁed perway failures. The logic
component of FTA helps determine priority of root causes where redundancy
exists. Geum et al. (2009) deﬁne Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as: `a means to
translate a physical system into a structured logic diagram, with the aim of
identifying the faults in the system and their inﬂuence on system function'.
The purpose of conventional FTA is to expand on a fault and trace the logic
back to the root cause of the fault. A methodology was developed for the
application of FTA to the railway context, presented in Fig. 2.13. The appli-
cability of FTA is explained.
Shalev and Tiran (2007) state that FTA is used primarily as a design tool
and propose a method of condition based data to create real-time failure rates
for each potential fault in the tree. This is an improved approach to the con-
ventional failure rate estimation, which is used during the design process of
a system. Their approach reveals that fault tree analysis can be used not
only during the design phase but when re-evaluating systems as well. FTA is
adaptable beyond the standard failures approach, to be used in other indus-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 30
Figure 2.13: Methodology for the construction of fault tree analysis for railway
perway.
tries. This is proven by alternative approaches in literature. Fuzzy fault tree
analysis was created by Jafarian and Rezvani (2012), which is a useful adapta-
tion to the standard process when quantitative analysis is not readily possible.
This approach was applied to the passenger railway industry to identify root
causes of passenger train derailment. The fuzzy method uses importance mea-
sures and error rates to calculate top event probability. In another adaptation,
fault tree analysis is used in combination with a Markov model, to assess time
independent and dependent factors together. The ﬁeld of application is medi-
cal, where failure probabilities are dependent on the time the patient has been
under the knife. Basic events are categorised in the fault tree and continu-
ous time failure probabilities are calculated using Markov chains. The tree is
modularised, which allows both standard tree calculation and Markov repre-
sentation in the same model (Zixian et al., 2011). Similar to a time continuous
instance, phased mission modelling is necessary to capture certain failure in-
stances. An example of this is the diﬀerent phases in a space shuttle mission,
where certain failures are critical only in speciﬁc mission phases. With this
method, fault trees are modularised for the diﬀerent mission phases and are
then converted into binary diagrams for mathematical computation. The fail-
ure probability of each mission phase can be calculated from these diagrams
(La Band and Andrews, 2004). It is apparent from the literature that, due to
the logical nature of fault tree analysis, it is adaptable to diﬀerent applications
and fault tree concepts can be translated to equivalent concepts. Fault tree
analysis is proven to be applicable to a continuous time situation and is not
conﬁned to a stagnant state. Adaptability is applied by the researcher when
analysing railway perway to determine root causes of critical failure modes.
Identifying root causes is simply for prevention purposes although mainte-
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nance and failure rates are not needed for each potential cause in the logic
tree. As complex fault tree methods were developed to determine failure rates
with little information, the standard fault tree will instead be applied in this
context, where failure rates are not necessary.
2.6 Track service life
According to the deﬁnition of reliability, section 2.2, life-time or service life of
a system is critical to its reliability. Exceeding a component or system life-
time as speciﬁed by the OEM or relevant standard could cause unreliability
in that system or component as its function degrades to unusable conditions.
This kind of component or system is considered unreliable. It is important to
understand how service life of perway components is measured so that service
life at a system level can be better understood.
Perway is primarily concerned with rails, sleepers, rail clips, rail pads and
ballast therefore components can be individually decommissioned by under-
standing the typical service life of components and tracking their current life.
In comparison to a rail, a concrete sleeper has a much higher service life (ap-
proximately 50 years) and the ballast is always shifting thus the rail is the
component of primary interest for service life considerations. Rail pads and
rail clips are subcomponents to rail and thus will not be able to provide clar-
ity to help classify perway lifetime. Fatigue is the root cause of much of the
component degradation which is a time and load based phenomenon. Service
life of track components is generally measured by GTM (gross ton mile) as
there is no reliable means to determine fatigue damage for these components
(Mundrey, 2010). Once main-line rails have reached their service life limit,
they are used on sidings and in yards. This is attributed to the fact that rails
are often removed before the end of their useful life for safety precaution. This
switch-over happens after approximately 20 years or according to a rated GTM
limit. The limits are presented in Table 2.2 from the Belgian standard. The
life of rail clips and rail pads vary signiﬁcantly between competitors but it is
important that they maintain their dynamic properties as long as possible. A
service life of 20 years has been cited from Washington Metropolitan Railway
Service.
With large or complex systems, deciding the age of the system is diﬃcult
as components in the system can have varying ages. Some components, such
as railway ballast, shift/change and thus are a mix of components of diﬀerent
ages. This anomaly identiﬁes perway as a complex system for which some sort
of life-time model should ideally exist. Without thorough data for the system
under consideration, it is impossible to disqualify components in the system
due to their age. If immediate exclusion is not possible, degrading systems are
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Table 2.2: Rail service life (Mundrey, 2010).
Rail section Total GTM carried
60 kg/m 500
52 kg/m 300 - 350
90 lb/yd 250 - 350
75 lb/yd 150 - 350
60 lb/yd 125 - 350
Note: The service life of the rails indicated above is for standard quality
rails with a UTS of 72 kg/sq mm. For rails with a UTS of 90 kg/sq mm,
the service life is taken as 11/2 times that of standard quality rails.
identiﬁed through reliability trend analysis. Typically, there will be a number
of track components in a track section that have passed their speciﬁed service
life. The system as a whole cannot be disqualiﬁed due to these old components
as they present only a small fraction of the total system. Suppose this fraction
is large and not small, it is known that rails are still used after their service life
for other applications. These systems are old but not necessarily unreliable in
a practical context. It is thus recommended by the researcher not to evaluate
assets according to their life-time but rather assess the condition of assets to
estimate useful life left. If an individual track asset is causing downtime on a
track corridor then the asset should be replaced without declaring the corridor
fundamentally unreliable. Old components are thus a limitation to reliability
analysis and old systems should not be compared with new ones in terms of
reliability. For example, a newly laid section of track should not be compared
with an old section in terms of reliability but old sections can be compared to
each other.
2.7 Data cleaning
Raw data is often obtained with missing data entries, repetition, omission of
information and bunched data in a single entry. Eﬀorts are being made in
the academic world to provide citation for data sets to create useful data that
can be re-used. The management of raw data to determine statistical trends
is very important if the accuracy of the discovered trends is to be conserved.
Data cleaning procedure controls the accuracy of data sorting as well as the
careful omission of data entries from a dataset. Literature was reviewed to
understand which methods for data cleaning are acceptable.
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Riera-Ledesma and Salazar-González (2007) produced an optimisation met-
hod that highlights the minimum number of data entries that need to be
changed to fulﬁl a new consistency criteria. This allows a previously inconsis-
tent dataset to be validated. They use a descending search algorithm, accel-
erated by Benders' cuts obtained by using Farkas' lemma on infeasible sets.
This produces a near optimum solution which locates the minimum number of
entries to be edited and uses an input operation to restore the feasibility of the
dataset. This research suggests that a level of consistency is expected in data
records. Sun et al. (2013) analysed yield data for crops located on a hillside to
clean up unreasonable outliers, distribution outliers and geographically mis-
placed data. The software removes data greater than 2.5 standard deviations
from the mean yield as well as removing crop entries that are inconsistent with
the mass of the yield per area. These operations indicate the necessity to re-
move outlier and inconsistent data from the set. A Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) was used to record geographic location of crops for planting.
Passes were tracked when planting and a location error was determinable when
comparing data co-ordinates to designated planting paths. This method can be
applied to railway infrastructure to record maintenance events geographically
when teams are in a rush and unable to record entries with the correct level of
detail. Location data is helpful to provide certainty that a data entry is indeed
valid. Bertossi et al. (2013) attempted to clean data by combining multiple
entries conveying similar information into a single data entry. They used a
matching dependency to do this, which is a function that combines the two
data entries correctly. An operation selects given data entries with identiﬁed
similarity using a search function and breaks up the entry into deﬁnite data
strings. The strings are compared and duplicate data is copied to a new cell.
This concept can be applied to infrastructure data to remove duplicate data
as well as combine similar data entries into single maintenance actions. These
data cleaning ideas converge in a paper by Van den Broeck et al. (2005) which
focuses on data cleaning techniques. They speak about errors when conduct-
ing research, errors when entering into a database and errors when analysing
the database and extracting data. They also discuss error possibilities for
database entries and diagnostic tools to improve the data, which will be the
stage at which data is encountered during this research. They further provide
a framework for thorough data analysis as presented in Fig. 2.14. From this
framework, in combination with the other methods discussed, perway mainte-
nance data can be cleaned to an acceptable standard before statistical analysis
is conducted.
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Figure 2.14: Framework for data cleaning (Van den Broeck et al., 2005).
2.8 Repairable and non-repairable system
reliability
When conducting reliability analysis, the deﬁnition of reliability allows for
statistical and deterministic methods. Deterministic methods are largely fo-
cused around safety engineering and economic analysis. With the availability
of statistical failure data, a hard scientiﬁc method exists for reliability calcu-
lation through observed occurrences. Further, it is important to determine
whether the system under consideration can be modelled as repairable or non-
repairable. Non-repairable components are discarded when they fail whereas
repairable components can experience an improved condition. It is from the
vantage point of repairable system reliability that literature is considered for
the purposes of railway perway maintenance. This being said, there are cer-
tain types of repairable systems which are modelled with non-repairable theory
due to certain unique system characteristics and so repairable system theory
is loosely applied as well. There are two important deﬁnitions.
1) Repairable system: It is a system which, after failing to perform at least
one of its required functions, can be restored to performing all of its required
functions by any method, other than replacement of the entire system.
2) Socket : It is a circuit or equipment position which, at any given time,
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holds a part of a given type.
It is important at this point to distinguish between the statistical analysis of
a part and the analysis of system failure data. With parts, we are dealing with
a distribution of time to a single failure whereas the times between successive
failures of a system are modelled by a sequence of distribution functions, i.e., by
a point process (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). Multiple parts must be tested to
failure to generate a sequence of failure times, suﬃcient for statistical analysis.
Failures of a single system are suﬃcient for statistical analysis if there are
enough observed interarrival times. In an example of railway perway, a track
section contains many parts, such as nuts, bolts, rail clips, sleepers, etc. and
these parts make up a system (asset). The statistical failure of the section of
perway can, therefore, be modelled by multiple failures from diﬀerent parts
in a reliability block network or multiple failures of a single system. The
system approach is less data intensive and thus will be the focus of further
investigation.
2.9 Two important reliability theory functions
There has been much ambiguity in literature when discussing the cornerstone
principles of repairable systems as to what exactly has been deﬁned. This
ambiguity is clariﬁed in this section. These functions are an important part of
building a practical system reliability model.
2.9.1 Rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF)
The rate of occurrence of failures function is the system point process model
equivalent of the FOM. The ROCOF is an absolute rate. To understand
ROCOF, we ﬁrst have to consider a counting process {N(t), t ≥ 0}. A counting
process is a stochastic point process model that is described as a sequence of
failures in time (a counting process), presented in Fig. 2.15. The expected
value of N(t) is denoted V (t), V (t) ≡ E[N(t)]. V (t) is assumed to be a
continuous function. v(t) ≡ V ′(t) which is the time rate of change of an
expected number of failures i.e. the rate of occurrence of failures (Ascher and
Feingold, 1984).
2.9.2 Reliability
The reliability function is also known as the `survivor' function. The reliabil-
ity maps the probability that a part or system will survive past a certain time
before failure. As reliability can be applied to parts or systems, the deﬁni-
tion includes the potential for both interpretations. It is important that the
reliability depends on the entire history of the process up to and including
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Figure 2.15: Counting process for a number of system failures.
the instant beginning the interval of interest. This condition is denoted |Ht
(Ascher and Feingold 1984, eqn. 2.7).
R(t, t+ τ) ≡ Pr{N(t, t+ τ) = 0 |Ht} (2.7)
2.10 Statistical analysis of system failure data
Statistical analysis of system failure data involves three stages during which
the probabilistic model of the system is created, namely trend testing, param-
eter estimation and choosing the best ﬁt for the selected point process model.
These sections are discussed as well as scientiﬁc fundamentals to reduce the
complexity encountered during analysis of such systems. In applying these
three steps, we assume that data is available for each system considered and
each system is analysed independently. The ﬂow process detailing the steps
in model design is presented in Fig. 2.16. From the ﬁgure, NHPP and re-
newal process blocks are of particular importance as these models are most
commonly applied to system failure data. The NHPP model exists for data
whose interarrivals are neither independent nor identically distributed due to
presence of trends in the failure data. This is typical for repairable systems
whose reliability characteristics are improving or deteriorating. If no trend
is observed then data is identically distributed but not necessarily indepen-
dent. Independence is often assumed when no trends are present as many
data points are necessary to conduct independence tests. No trend results in
a renewal process for which non-repairable system theory is applied. (Ascher
and Feingold, 1984).
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Figure 2.16: Statistical analysis decision tool for a point process (Ascher and
Feingold, 1984).
2.11 Trend testing
Trend testing is concerned with the understanding of which point process
model is applicable to the available failure data. The test weighs the statistical
likelihood of a certain stationary sequence occurring, as the null hypothesis, op-
posed to a certain type of trend occurring, as the alternative hypothesis. With
simplifying assumptions, this process helps categorise the failure sequence to a
type of point process. A vast number of trend tests exist and a few of these are
discussed. Additional tests such as the Military Handbook test (MIL-HDBK-
189, 1981) and the Mann test (Louit et al., 2009) can be understood from the
literature.
2.11.1 Laplace
Null hypothesis - HPP | Alternative hypothesis - Monotonic trend
In a practical context, the number of failures in comparative systems varies
quite drastically because each system is modelled independently. We discuss
the speciﬁc situation where we have m pre-speciﬁed failures T1, T2, ..., Tm−1.
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Figure 2.17: Standard normal distribution used in Laplace test.
Under the HPP assumption, the ﬁrst m arrival times are the order statistics
from a uniform distribution on (0, Tm]. This means that the probability of
experiencing a medium length interarrival time as opposed to a long or short
one is higher, as is the case for a uniform distribution. Equation 2.8 presents
the uniform distribution, which approximates a standard normal variate with

















Equation 2.8 is analogous to equation 2.9, which is the equation for a stan-
dardised score from a normal distribution; where Υ is the score of a unit in the
population, µ is the mean of the population and σ is the standard deviation.
This distribution is presented in Fig. 2.17. An example of this test is provided
by considering successive numbers of inter-arrival times:
200, 195, 162, 145, 120, 104, 60, 49, 32, 2.
U = +2.0 for this test, which indicates a deteriorating system. Thus, if the
U value falls within the 5% rejection region in this two-tailed test (< −1.96
or > +1.96) then it is conclusive that the point process does not ﬁt a HPP
and follows a monotonic trend, according to the alternative hypothesis. The
Laplace test is optimum against the NHPP log linear model, which is presented
here and referenced from a later section, eqn. (2.16). This test was recently
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For small U values, it seems very unlikely that a trend exists for the data.
Coetzee (2004) presented a case for the application of the Laplace trend test,
stating that for low Laplace statistics, a renewal system is likely. He stated
that any Laplace statistic within one standard deviation of the mean indicates
that the data is non-committal as it closely follows a renewal process. A grey
area therefore exists between one standard deviation and the 1.96 rejection
value where no conclusions can be made about the data. Further trend tests
are required in this case.
2.11.2 Lewis-Robinson
Null hypothesis - Renewal | Alternative hypothesis - Monotonic trend
The Lewis-Robinson test serves the same function as the Mann test (Louit
et al., 2009) but it does not use a ranking scale, rather a numerical scale is
used which allows for the generation of a complete distribution (Wang and
Coit, 2005). In this test, the interarrival times for the reverse arrangements
are assumed to be independent under both the null and alternative hypothesis.
This means that the nature of independence of the interarrivals is not known.
The test statistic ULR is formed (Lewis and Robinson 1974, eqn. 2.10) by








Using the same inter-arrival times for the Laplace test example provided,
ULR = +16 which shows a large degradation past +1.96 that marks the start
of the upper tier failure region for the test. The failure region for this test is
applied in the same way as the Laplace test.
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2.12 Point process models
A number of models have been applied to repairable systems; namely Homoge-
neous Poisson Process, Non-homogeneous Poisson Process, Renewal Process,
Superimposed Renewal Process and Branching Poisson Process. These models
are the basis for any failure prediction for systems. The powerful trend tests in
literature are centred around the ﬁrst of these three processes (Ascher and Fein-
gold, 1984), with speciﬁc emphasis on Homogeneous and Non-homogeneous
Poisson Processes.
2.12.1 Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP)
The HPP is deﬁned as a non-terminating sequence of independent and iden-
tically exponentially distributed Xi's. Due to independence, each interarrival
time has no knowledge of the previous and thus each failure follows an ex-
ponential probability of failure with time (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). The
statement about identical distribution is the same as classifying stationarity.
The mathematical deﬁnition of an HPP is as follows:
The counting process {N(t), t ≥ 0} qualiﬁes as an HPP if
a) N(0) = 0
b) {N(t), t ≥ 0} has independent increments.
c) The number of failures in any interval of length t2− t1 has a Poisson dis-
tribution with mean ρ(t2−t1). The Poisson formula with the mean substituted
in is presented (Ascher and Feingold 1984, eqn. 2.11).




for j ≥ 0. ρ or in this case v(t) is the constant rate of occurrence of
failures (ROCOF). For the HPP, v(t) is constant for both synchronous and
asynchronous sampling. Knowing that the interarrivals are exponentially dis-
tributed, the deﬁnition of reliability and equation (2.11), the reliability func-
tion is
R(t1, t2) = e
−ρ(t2−t1) (2.12)
2.12.2 Non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP)
The only diﬀerence between the NHPP and the HPP is that the rate of occur-
rence of failure varies with time for the NHPP. Although independent incre-
ments still exist, this means that theXi's of the NHPP are neither independent
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nor identically distributed (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). The modiﬁcation from
the HPP to the NHPP is stated.
c) The number of failures in an interval of length t2 − t1 has a Poisson
distribution with the mean
∫ t2
t1
ρ(t)dt, expressed mathematically as (Ascher
and Feingold 1984, eqn. 2.13),









for j ≥ 0. From condition c), it follows that




From (2.13), the reliability function of the NHPP is
R(t1, t2) = e
− ∫ t2t1 ρ(t)dt (2.15)
The NHPP became a system model due to the fact that only a small
percentage of a system's parts are replaced during repairs. Due to this fact,
the assumption that the reliability before and after repair is approximately the
same is reasonable. The two functional forms of the NHPP are the log linear
model and the power law model. The log linear model (Lisnianski et al. 2010,
eqn. 2.16) is expressed as
ρ1(t) = e
α0+α1t, −∞ < α0, α1 <∞, t ≥ 0 (2.16)
Eqn. (2.16) is substituted into (2.14) generate the expected number of failures
for the log linear model,
E{N(t2 − t1)} = e
α0
α1
(eα1t2 − eα1t1) (2.17)
The form of the log linear model is substituted into equation (2.15) to deter-
mine the reliability,




The second form of the NHPP, the power law model (Crow 1990, eqn. 2.19)
is presented.
ρ2(t) = λβt
β−1, λ, β > 0, t ≥ 0 (2.19)
Considering the form of (2.16), the expected number of failures for the power
law model is
E{N(t2 − t1)} = λ(tβ2 − tβ1 ) (2.20)
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The reliability for this model can be easily computed as
R(t1, t2) = e
−λ(tβ2−tβ1 ) (2.21)
2.12.3 IID data
After trend tests have been conducted on data and no trend is conﬁrmed, a
renewal process is typically assumed. If there is no evidence that the point
process is not IID, then a homogeneous Poisson process is assumed. This as-
sumption rests on a conﬁrmed `no trend' result from trend tests. Techniques to
model this data are well known but ﬁtting a Weibull distribution to the data is
a technique which will speciﬁcally be considered here. Fitting a Weibull model
to data is covered by Grobbelaar and Visser (2015). The inter-arrival times
ﬁrst need to be reordered in terms of magnitude, according to the deﬁnition
of the cumulative distribution function
FX(x) ≡ Pr{X ≤ x}
This means that if the data was not in order of magnitude, the probability
estimates would be inaccurate due to issues of overlap, according to the deﬁ-
nition. Parameters can then be estimated for the distribution for the Weibull
cumulative distribution function (Al-Fawzan 2000, eqn. 2.22),
FX(x) = 1− e−(x/η)β (2.22)
The researcher conducted a preliminary analysis on the case study and ob-
served that the occurrence of `no trend' data for which a Weibull ﬁt is appli-
cable would not be encountered. Simple analysis revealed that for the railway
network under consideration, increasing trends would be dominant, although
some `no trend' data might exist. As a result, Weibull distributions were ﬁt
to data using parameter estimation methods discussed in future sections. In
addition, the Chi-square goodness of ﬁt test (Modarres et al., 2009) and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Sachs, 2013) were applied to the data. Through the
application of these methods, the researcher is able to apply developed reliabil-
ity models to a `no trend' case. As `no trend' cases weren't encountered in the
case study and `trend' cases are expected to occur more frequently, reliability
predictions and supporting methods for 'no trend' cases were not included in
this document.
2.13 Parameter estimation
After trend tests are conducted on data to determine a point process model to
be applied, the model needs to ﬁt the data by estimating parameters as inputs
into the selected point process equations. Diﬀerent estimation techniques are
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available, with their own advantages for application on diﬀerent point pro-
cess models. Of the many methods available, two of the most common are
least squares estimation and maximum likelihood estimation which have been
applied to datasets of small samples.
2.13.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
To explain the maximum likelihood estimation procedure, letX1, X2, ..., Xn de-
note n independent, identically distributed random variables with the density
function f(x; θ1, θ2, ..., θm), where f is of known form and θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θm)
belongs to a subset Θ of m-dimensional space but is otherwise unknown.
X1, X2, ..., Xn could, for example, represent the lifetimes of n identical units in
an inverse Gaussian distribution f . The joint density function of ofX1, X2, ..., Xn
is given by
∏n
i=1 f(xi;θ) for ﬁxed x1, x2, ..., xn. Say there is a ﬁxed x1, x2, ..., xn
for θ. This function is expressed as
L(θ;x1, x2, ..., xn) = L(θ;x) (2.23)
L(θ;x) is called the likelihood function. For a discrete distribution of X,
L(θ;x) is the probability of observing the values x1, x2, ..., xn for a given θ
and thus indicates how likely it is to obtain the observations x1, x2, ..., xn for
a given θ.
The ﬁrst step in solving the MLE of θ, is to use the likelihood equation (Rau-




= 0 for j = 1, 2, ...,m (2.24)
Often non-linear equations are produced from a form of solution which can
be processed using numerical methods (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Note
that the maximum likelihood method works for both parts and systems, thus
the variable X can be replaced with the variable T .
2.13.2 Least Squares Estimation (LSE)
Least squares estimation follows the simple statistical curve ﬁtting approach
of plotting a line that produces the smallest square of the diﬀerence between
expected and observed values. The parameter values that produce a least




[Yi − f(xi, θ)]2 (2.25)
where θ = θ0, θ1, ..., θm which are the same parameters chosen for any point
process model or distribution and Yi is the observed value of a random variable.
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Operations research methods are employed through the Excel solver tool to
compute model parameters that produce the least squares against the observed
failures from a dataset.
2.13.3 Non-homogenous Poisson Process
The two forms of the NHPP that were selected are discussed for their applica-
bility in ﬁtting model parameters. Lisnianski et al. (2010) used the maximum
likelihood method to determine estimations for the log linear NHPP (Lisni-
anski et al. 2010, eqn. 2.26),
eαˆ0 =
nαˆ1








The same MLE principle can be applied to determine the estimated parameters












These methods were applied to the arrival times of an exemplar system's fail-
ures,
190, 368, 511, 633, 745, 813, 864, 914, 946, 956
The Laplace trend test returned a statistic of +2.03, which indicates an
increasing trend. For this, a NHPP log linear model was ﬁt to the data using
the MLE method such that N(t) = 0.4595e0.0033t. The derivative of this func-
tion is the ROCOF form, ρ1(t) = eα0+α1t where α0 = −6.50 and α1 = 0.0033.
The LSE method was applied to the exponential function N(t) = (eα0/α1)eα1t
to ﬁnd the least square estimation of the log linear parameters. This produced
N(t) = 0.6482e0.0028t with parameters α0 = −6.31 and α1 = 0.0028 for the
ROCOF. Eqn. (2.25) is called the sum of square errors (SSE). The smallest
SSE between the MLE and LSE is a basic indication of the best ﬁt for the
chosen model as the calculated ﬁt most closely predicts the observed data in
this case. The SSE for the MLE ﬁt is 4.32, compared to the SSE of 0.873 for
the LSE ﬁt. The LSE more closely ﬁts what actually happened to the system.
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A NHPP power law model was ﬁt to the failure data above for comparison
to the log linear model. The MLE produced N(t) = 7.32 × 10−7t2.39. The
derivative of this function is the ROCOF form, ρ2(t) = λβtβ−1 where λ =
7.32×10−7 and β = 2.39. The LSE method was applied to the power function
N(t) = λtβ to ﬁnd the least square estimation of the power law parameters.
This produced N(t) = 1.31 × 10−5t1.96 with parameters λ = 1.31 × 10−5 and
β = 1.96 for the ROCOF. The SSE for the MLE ﬁt is 5.37, compared to the
SSE of 2.70 for the LSE ﬁt. The LSE more closely ﬁts what actually happened
to the system. In both cases, the LSE provided far better estimates of the
actual data. The log linear model seems to provide a better ﬁt in terms of
SSE. A ﬁrst estimate about model preference has been made with SSE. An
argument is made for goodness of model ﬁt in the following section.
2.14 Goodness of ﬁt
Once models have been ﬁt to failure data, the ﬁt needs to be tested to ensure
an adequate representation of the data. The Chi-square and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) tests exist to measure the observations from the data against
the expected statistics from the model. These tests are applicable to Weibull
distributions of IID data. The K-S test and Cramer von Mises tests do not
apply easily to the power law and log linear NHPP models as they were not
originally developed for the parametric case, according to Coetzee (1997). In
addition, as NHPP models are point processes, a distribution exists for ev-
ery inter-arrival time in the model. This means that goodness of ﬁt tests
such as K-S that test the ﬁt of a single distribution are rendered ineﬀective.
The Chi-square test can be applied however, although there normally aren't
enough data points for an eﬀective test. Alternative methods are considered
as supporting selection of the best model for a NHPP.
2.14.1 Comparing log linear and power law models
In statistics, the goodness of ﬁt of a model to data is calculated with the
coeﬃcient of determination (R2). This coeﬃcient explains the amount of error
in a model, which is expressed as a performance percentage. The coeﬃcient of
determination is a robust explanation of ﬁt as it accounts for variance of the
mean of data as well as variance of each point prediction. These variances are
explained by (Barrett 2000, eqn. 2.28)
R2 =
∑





where the latent error of the model is explained by the ﬁrst term in the
numerator of eqn. (2.28). The second term in the numerator explains the error
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between observations and predicted values. The coeﬃcient of determination
can be used to compare the ﬁt of power law and log linear models, with the
higher percentage indicating the better ﬁt. Crowder et al. (1994) compare
maximum likelihood values as a supplementary method to determine whether
log linear or power law models oﬀer a better ﬁt. As least squares estimation
often produces better parameters for the log linear and power law models, the
maximum likelihood approach has limited application.
Crowder et al. (1994) linearised the log linear and power law models by
applying the natural logarithm to the equations. They argue that the linearised
model with the best ﬁt straight line is a better model for the system. The
form of the log linear equation is not appropriate for linearisation when it is
expressed as cumulative number of failures against time. An estimate for the




[Tj−1 + Tj]) =
N(Tj)−N(Tj−1)
Tj − Tj−1 (2.29)
where the observation period (0, Tm] is divided into m arbitrary intervals
(0, T1], (T1, T2], ..., (Tk−1, Tm]. An approximate shape for the ROCOF is de-
termined by the explained equation. Multiple iterations of interval selection
should be conducted to ensure that the shape isn't attributed to the chosen
subdivision. The linearisation method provides the same argument for best ﬁt
as the coeﬃcient of determination as the same variances determine the best ﬁt
for each method. The R2 method is preferred as it is less subjective than the
linearisation method, but the linearisation method provides support from liter-
ature as it has been used for non-repairable reliability computations (Saldanha
et al., 2001).
2.14.2 Conﬁdence bounds
As failure trend predictions are made from estimated ROCOF equations, one
may be interested in knowing with what conﬁdence predictions can be made.
Conﬁdence bounds are placed around estimates of observed data to state how
much the actual trend can deviate from the model. Narrow conﬁdence bounds
at 95% conﬁdence indicate that the observed data ﬁts within the bands at 95%
probability. Equations for conﬁdence bounds on data are derived statistically.
Cryer and Kellet (1986) shows that conﬁdence for predictions decreases as
time increases as the distant future is more uncertain than near future. This
phenomenon explains why conﬁdence bounds are very broad when predictions
are being made from a time series. One would expect that statisticians pre-
dict with very sure conﬁdence, but this is not the case in reality. Statistics
simply uses the best methods available to make the best possible predictions.
Vlok (2012) uses these arguments to place conﬁdence bands around ROCOF
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estimates. He ﬁrst uses the Fisher information matrix to determine variance





















where V ar(θˆ) is the variance of a estimated parameter, Cov(θˆ0θˆ1) is the
variance between two selected geometry parameters and Iρ is the log likelihood
of a selected ROCOF model. From the matrix, the variance of a ROCOF form
is calculated (Vlok 2012, eqn. 2.31),
V ar(ρˆ(t)) = (
∂ρ(t)
∂θˆ0
)2 · V ar(θˆ0) + (∂ρ(t)
∂θˆ1
)2 · V ar(θˆ1) . . . (2.31)





The conﬁdence bounds on a ROCOF model are ﬁnally determined using a
statistical equation for conﬁdence (Barrett 2000, eqn. 2.32),
ρˆ(t)− zα
√
V ar(ρˆ(t)) ≤ ρ(t) ≤ ρˆ(t) + zα
√
V ar(ρˆ(t)) (2.32)
where zα = 1.96 for a 95% conﬁdence bound. Conﬁdence bounds can be
compared for diﬀerent models to determine which model has a tighter ﬁt. It is
desired to make reliability predictions with tight conﬁdence to ensure accuracy
of reliability estimates. In reality, conﬁdence bounds on predictions in any
time series are broad, but predictions are still made out of necessity. This is
conﬁrmed by Vlok (2012) who states that conﬁdence on residual life estimates
are broad. He further states that conﬁdence can be signiﬁcantly improved with
the inclusion of condition maintenance data. If this is not available, the best
predictions must be made with the data available.
2.15 Risk analysis
Risk has conventionally been used in engineering to calculate and mitigate
hazards aﬀecting people but risk has more recently been used as a mainte-
nance prioritisation tool to save cost or improve reliability of systems. Risk is
deﬁned by Harnly (1998) as Risk = Probability × Consequence. This means
that a risk is weighed according to the likelihood of it occurring and the sever-
ity of its occurrence. He further explains that risk assessment can either be
qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative analyses require extensive statistical
data, records and documentation whereas qualitative is more subjective. The
idea of a risk matrix was formed here by which estimates for risk severity and
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Figure 2.18: Risk matrix varieties (Markowski and Mannan, 2008).
occurrence are made. The risk matrix is considered to be the cornerstone of
risk analysis as this tool remained throughout the development of risk analysis
and it simply displays the results of rigorous methods.
2.15.1 Risk categories
Markowski and Mannan (2008) oﬀer a 3D representation of a standard risk
matrix and detail some important notions about risk matrices. They stated
that prioritisation within a risk matrix has no external or empirical measure-
ment outside of the risk matrix. This means that there exist multiple ways
that high or low risk can be determined within a matrix. An example of three
ways to arrange the risk categories within a matrix are presented in Fig. 2.18.
The hard matrix is for a high cost maintenance scheme; the standard matrix
represents a typical risk matrix in the process industry and the easy option is
a low cost matrix, which also is less safe. The selection of risk categories will
then depend on the desired maintenance strategy as well as real-case main-
tenance considerations such as cost and material on-hand. Markowski and
Mannan (2008) used fuzzy numbers to quantify uncertainty in risk analysis to
provide a more accurate 3D map of risk possibilities than for standard analy-
sis. Fuzziﬁcation is only necessary for systems which are well understood, with
plenty available data that have already been modelled as standard systems in
the past.
2.15.2 Probabilistic methods
Khan et al. (2008) use a Markov (multi-state) model to calculate availability
of components in a power plant, as the probabilistic arm of risk analysis. Suf-
ﬁcient statistical data was available to conduct a trend analysis which enabled
availability calculations. In systems that have been running for a relatively
short time, such as the tunnel lighting system investigated by Ng et al. (2003),
probabilities need to be estimated qualitatively as data for statistical analy-
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sis has not yet accumulated. Another way to calculate failure probabilities is
the Bayesian approach, used by Paté-Cornell (2002). This method was used
to identify human error in the installation and maintenance of heat shields in
NASA aircraft. As large datasets were not available due to the small frequency
of space missions, the expert reliant Bayesian approach was the most applica-
ble way to evaluate likelihood of accident occurrence. He also used statistical
data in another study to determine rate of accidents caused by anaesthetists
in surgery. It appears that such methods are based on mean times between
failures and are not probabilistic trend related. A unique approach to proba-
bility was suggested by Podoﬁllini et al. (2006), with application to the railway
industry using ultrasonic inspection of rail. They used the concept of the P-F
intervals, which is the time between maintenance inspection of a fault and the
failure caused by the fault. The average rate at which cracks propagate was
tracked and a standard curve was drawn for probability of failure for a par-
ticular class of crack. This model can be viewed as a distribution describing
failure of many identical parts. Trend analysis was not conducted on statistical
data, but rather average failure rates with standard deviation were considered.
These risk analysis options all have intuitive application to the case study at
hand but incorporation of trend analysis of statistical data is lacking. This
is perhaps a weakness of the proposed methods, that estimates of probability
lack quantitative support.
2.15.3 Innovation in risk analysis
Risk analysis methods often evolve from speciﬁc needs and, for that reason,
models seem individualistic. Khan et al. (2008) used monetary cost of failure







where yi is the likelihood factor, expressed as availability. Another extrap-
olation of the classic risk equation is the severity index used by Harnly (1998),
which is expressed as SI = F × (S + E). F is the failure potential, S is
the safety factor and E is the economic impact on operations. This equation
is useful in speciﬁc application but it is ill-advised to rank risk according to
too many measures, but rather focus on the measure that is most important
to minimise. A more appropriate individualistic risk analysis method is the
probability versus cost approach by Podoﬁllini et al. (2006) to minimise cost of
railway track inspection while reducing the probability of derailment of trains.
The power of this method is the detailed cost analysis incorporated and the
route optimisation model to minimise cost of an inspection run. The method
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Figure 2.19: Risk in the business context (Ng et al., 2003).
thus incorporates probability and severity in a focused manner to solve specif-
ically observable and measurable problems.
2.15.4 Implementing a risk management programme
Ng et al. (2003) stress the importance of following a risk management pro-
cess (RMP) to ensure that risks aren't simply categorised but that rankings
from the risk analysis are implementable and well documented. The ﬁve core
elements of risk analysis are: risk identiﬁcation, risk measurement, risk assess-
ment, risk evaluation, risk control and monitoring. This process is followed
to not only prioritise risks but to transfer the analysis outputs to scheduled
maintenance tasks. This process is presented in Fig. 2.19. They argue that
resources, management support and risk acceptance on an operational level
allows for the scheduling of maintenance. Harnly (1998) created a detailed
procedure for risk management in the business context because maintenance
inspectors were scheduling repairs and the operations department did not be-
lieve that correct priority was given to risks. His framework ensured that both
inspectors and operations were consulted to arrive at risk rankings that were
implementable. Backlund and Hannu (2002) investigated the translation from
risk analysis to maintenance decisions and the roadblocks to eﬀective imple-
mentation of strategy. They stressed that after risk estimation, there needs to
be a paper trail whereby the risk analysis is veriﬁed and documented. If this
is not done then maintenance cannot be prioritised as decision makers will not
understand the steps followed to arrive at a qualiﬁed decision on risk ranking.
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2.16 Summary of solution methods
The researcher analysed literature on solution methods to create a model that
compares track sections for the sake of maintenance prioritisation. Solutions
from many industries were sourced, including the passenger railway industry.
It is forward thinking to identify solution methods even if they haven't been
used for railway before. A research avenue is thus created in which problems
can be tackled in more detail. Two potential solutions are discussed for further
research consideration, such that practical implementation will arise.
2.16.1 Risk/reliability section model
For railway perway maintenance, it is important to know what the impact of a
perway failure is, as well as how often failures occur. This information allows
the maintenance engineer to be able to predict not only how often failures
occur, but also the severity that a failure can be expected to have. The pro-
cess can be described by a risk matrix model, where reliability indicates how
likely failures will occur and average train delay caused by failures indicates
the severity of the expected failures in a given track section. The reliability
model can be applied to railway perway at three diﬀerent levels: A track corri-
dor, asset level and component level. The track corridor level is where failures
are analysed at points anywhere between two train stations on a railway net-
work. Asset level is where points along a track encompass a speciﬁc type of
rail conﬁguration, which is considered to be an asset and failures on an asset
are tagged. Component level is where components that make up a perway
asset are tracked for component failure.
For track corridor level, a criticality analysis needs to be conducted to un-
derstand the failure modes and their eﬀect on the train network. The failure
modes must be well understood as only failure modes that aﬀect the operation
of trains will aﬀect perway reliability. This is according to the deﬁnition, as
any component acting apart from design conditions (failure) is considered to
be unreliable. Once the failure modes are understood, a dataset of track in-
cidents must be obtained. This dataset is then ﬁltered to only include failure
modes that aﬀect the operation of trains. A speed restriction or potential train
stoppage is considered to be an eﬀect worthy of being called unreliable. Re-
pairable systems' modelling can be applied to the remaining data to determine
reliability versus time curves. If no statistical trend is observed for data, then
non-repairable system theory describes the system. This will identify track
corridors that are most likely to experience the next failure. At asset level, the
same procedure is followed to determine failure modes of track assets (which
will be the same failure modes as for the corridors). In this model, data on
each track asset is required to obtain reliability estimates for each asset. This
model is set apart in that it shows maintenance personnel where to maintain
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on a more speciﬁc level. The corridor level gives maintenance a map of where
to maintain in the network whereas asset level gives a map of which assets
to maintain in the corridor. For component level, a reliability block diagram
can be developed for a track system based on reliability estimation methods
for each track component. The basis of this reliability model is the probabil-
ity of train derailment caused by geometric rail irregularities. Derailment is
considered to be failure of the track system according to the deﬁnition, thus a
reliability basis for the system is established. This method produces a single
reliability statistic for each few meters of perway, from which a micro track
maintenance schedule can be built. This model helps maintenance engineers
to identify faults at component level, the smallest possible of the three levels.
Data capture needs to be more thorough, the lower the level of reliability
analysis and a high failure rate over the entire network is necessary to capture
enough failures consistently to generate an eﬀective model. Failure analysis at
the track corridor level is most likely to produce an eﬀective analysis. This,
coupled with estimates for failure mode severity, produces a risk metric for
each track corridor, which can be compared between corridors.
2.16.2 Discussion of solution methods
The use of the existing TQI solution is an eﬀective way of ensuring that track
geometry is at a high standard. However, this method does not provide a
scheduling solution for preventative work tasks and does not always eliminate
the cause of poor track geometry. The reliability-based risk solution provides
a comparative tool for preventative maintenance tasks, while mitigating root
causes of failure. The TQI tool has some overlap with a reliability-based risk
tool as the risk factor for track corridors is sometimes high as a result of the
failures that have caused the deviation of track geometry. The overlap between
these methods can be exploited to cross correlate the methods. The trend be-
tween TQI and reliability suggests that, for extreme cases of TQI, there should
be a correlation with risk methods. Variables such as track age could prevent
an establishment of the relationship between TQI and reliability. The failure
to ﬁnd such a relationship using this method does not necessarily mean that
there is no relationship. The most practical comparison is made by comparing
risk and TQI for a corridor with a high count of failure events.




Priority Using Risk and Reliability
Every department in a passenger railway company has its own and unique
challenges. At PRASA Infrastructure, ﬁre-ﬁghting tactics for maintenance
are prevalent because many types of failures seem random and diﬃcult to pre-
dict, according to an in-oﬃce civil engineer (personal communication, 9 March
2015). Condition-based maintenance and reactive maintenance is employed,
using the IM2000 track recording car and maintenance teams respectively (Za-
ayman, 2011). There is value in condition-based maintenance as it allows for
preventative maintenance, using a maintenance tool called track quality index
(TQI). The shortfall of this method is that it has no direct link to failure modes
of a perway and there is no direct link between TQI and failure prevention. It
is anticipated that employing a scientiﬁc preventative maintenance method to
railway infrastructure would allow for better control over maintenance activi-
ties (Song, 2009) and create a basis for failure prevention. This would prevent
opportunity losses that are associated with reactive maintenance, caused by
interruptions of service due to perway failure. Such a method would avoid the
exorbitant cost of maintaining the railway perway to perfect condition, which
is the only certain way to ensure perway reliability using condition-based meth-
ods.
For preventative maintenance to be cost eﬀective, sections of perway need
to be strategically maintained. This means that perway sections that are in
danger of failure have a higher priority over healthy perway sections. It is im-
portant to be able to predict when perway failures will occur so that they can
be prevented through foresight. Thus, an eﬀect and criticality analysis as well
as a fault tree analysis will be conducted on the PRASA tracks in the Western
Cape Region to determine track failure modes that aﬀect the operation of the
train. If these failure modes can be predicted and prevented, then an eﬀec-
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tive preventative maintenance strategy can be created and the train service
will become more reliable. Reliability methods are used for the prediction of
failures, based on failure history to create a reliability model. This reliability
model presents the likelihood of occurrence of perway failures. A risk metric
then allows the prioritisation of perway sections for maintenance, based on
the likelihood that the next failure will occur in a speciﬁc track section along
with a failure severity. This distinguishes between track sections with low risk
failures and track sections with high risk failures. A risk matrix is created
using the reliability statistic and risk measure.
At PRASA, instead of condition-based maintenance aiding preventative
maintenance, it seems that condition-based is in fact the primary means for
maintenance. This is contrary to the ﬁndings of Golmakani and Pouresmaeeli
(2014). Risk-based maintenance and preventative maintenance thresholds can
be applied directly to the rail environment using FMECA and reliability cen-
tred maintenance. When a reliability threshold is decided, maintenance of a
certain cost: performance ratio is established.
3.1 Maintenance investigation
Metrorail maintenance practices were investigated at the Salt River train de-
pot, Cape Town to understand current maintenance performance and to iden-
tify improvement areas. This was done by interacting with personnel on-site as
well as making observations. Literature on maintenance methods for multiple
industrial applications is consulted to translate improvement methods to the
railway environment.
3.1.1 Maintenance of the perway network
The Metrorail train network transports 1.7 million South Africans to work
daily. The railway service is, therefore, an important driver of the South
African economy. Fig. 3.1 presents a map of the network. Any reference to
train stations is in association with this map. The perway division is respon-
sible for maintaining track assets, ensuring that trains can pass safety from
station to station without delay, obstruction or safety hazard. These topics
were discussed in an infrastructure meeting that the researcher was invited to
attend in May 2015. The systems manager from head oﬃce was presenting
on maintenance frequencies for components based on statistical failure history.
He was motivating maintenance staﬀ to convert from corrective maintenance
to a new preventative maintenance strategy. The staﬀ was opposed to the idea
as this required maintenance frequencies far beyond their capacity. Thus, it
remains diﬃcult to shift the percentage of corrective to preventative mainte-
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Figure 3.1: Reduced map of the Cape Town perway network.
nance in favour of more preventative maintenance. It is in this context that
maintenance prioritisation will thrive.
3.1.2 Current maintenance performance
The pareto principle states that maintenance should be conducted 80/20 (80%
preventative vs. 20% corrective). Based on PRASA's supplied perway failure
history, an approximated maintenance representation is 50/50 (50% preven-
tative vs. 50% corrective). This rule satisﬁed the need for a corrective and
preventative maintenance strategy as discovered during problem case analysis.
The only way to correct this maintenance imbalance is to increase mainte-
nance productivity and conduct preventative maintenance more strategically.
Other performance measurements were considered, which are adapted from
operations performance indicators. Metrorail Cape Town has an availability
of 78.8% for infrastructure as of 2014/15, which is short of the 95.9% target
(professional communication, March 2015). This benchmark was considered as
research of the problem case revealed its importance (Stenstrom et al., 2013;
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Figure 3.2: Database entry illustrating asset management levels for perway.
Åhrén, 2005). The delay minutes due to infrastructure faults has increased
from 2013 to 2014. A Metrorail Cape Town infrastructure clerk (personal
communication, 8 November 2014) reported 64 031 network delay minutes
due to perway faults in 2013, which increased to 180 872 delay minutes in
2014.
3.1.3 Perway asset management practices
To keep track of perway assets, PRASA uses an incident list database popu-
lated by operations fault reports. In addition, a work order database which
records call-outs on any maintenance job is used whether scheduled or unsched-
uled. Lastly, they use an asset register, which contains all perway assets and
their location, according to a kilometre marker system. These three databases
are consulted to understand what failures occur that aﬀect the train service,
what maintenance has been done on failed and functional perway assets as
well what assets are currently part of the perway network. The perway net-
work is managed at a line level, a system level and a sub-system level. The
perway equivalent to these levels is: line code, sections between train stations
and individual track assets. A simpliﬁed database entry is presented in Fig.
3.2 to illustrate this concept. The levels are analogous to the levels at which
reliability analysis can be conducted. Scoping in to the right level ensures that
failure data is available to coincide with the desired maintenance programme.
3.1.4 Meeting the standards of operations
The operations department presents the rolling stock and infrastructure de-
partments with reliability standards to ensure that a speciﬁc level of perfor-
mance is achieved by both departments. This allows for a buﬀer to manage
operational uncertainty which allows operations to schedule the train service
accordingly. The operations department expects a reliability of 90% for the
train service, which means that both trains and track need to operate at a
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reliability of 90%. Since reliability is time based, a future prediction of reli-
ability starts from the current time, zero. This indicates that reliability will
drop from a theoretical 100% at present time. The number of days of opera-
tion can be tracked from the current time until the reliability reaches 90% for
a track section. This is an indication of the state of maintenance of perway
as well as the ability of a perway corridor to pass a train safely. Reliability
is theoretical but it is based on historical failures, thus, it can be viewed as
feedback of failure prevention measures employed.
3.2 Track corridor reliability model
The developed reliability model is a series connection of perway assets that
spans a track corridor between train stations. Between each track asset is a
block joint asset which isolates the rail connections for the sake of a continuous
electrical circuit from the train catenary, through the traction motors and into
the ground through the rail. Block joints also exist between rail connections
within a perway asset. The discussed conﬁguration is presented in Fig. 3.3. A
perway asset typically spans a few hundred metres or it can simply be a rail
switch section for the trains to cross-over lines.
Figure 3.3: Reliability model of train network.
The current Metrorail track asset database spans 1227 tangent sections,
794 curve sections and 588 turnouts. Of the 588 turnouts; there are 313 one:
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twelve turnouts, 215 one: nine turnouts, 28 single slips, 19 double slips, 8
diamond crossings and 5 scissor crossings. A small selection of these assets
is considered for statistical analysis to prove applicability of the developed
method. Within each perway asset is a grouping of components from the
RBD shown in Fig. 2.3. Zooming in on this grouping is a means to break track
tangent and curve assets into more detailed units. This zoomed in component
level of reliability analysis is not further considered by the researcher due to
the practical limitations imposed on data capture. It is suﬃcient to conduct
reliability analysis for perway assets on a track corridor, even if the exact
asset cannot be identiﬁed. The reliability on that corridor, after all, depends
on the ability of the track to allow safe train passage according to operating
conditions. If the failure mode of an asset is known, the line on which the
failure occurred between stations and the time at which it occurred, system
reliability analysis is possible for the track corridor.
Figure 3.4: Reliability model of train network.
One would expect that a train can travel in only one direction from station
A to station B and any failure that aﬀects the train operation would be added
to a database of asset failures on that section. This assumption would result
in an overly simpliﬁed reliability analysis for world class railway networks. In
practical operation for international railway companies, when a track asset on
a line fails and the train cannot pass, the train is often switched to the line
where traﬃc ﬂows in the opposite direction. The extended model is presented
in Fig. 3.4. The traﬃc switching sometimes causes little or no delay but during
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peak times, there is a more signiﬁcant amount of delay. This extra option adds
redundancy into a reliability analysis. For Metrorail, traﬃc problems prevent
switching of trains and so Fig. 3.3 is the reliability model of choice.
3.3 Failure mode identiﬁcation and criticality
analysis
As discussed in the section 2.4, the FMECA methodology was applied to
PRASA perway. An interview was conducted at the PRASA train depot in Salt
River, with the Western Cape's Southern and Northern line track inspector.
From the interview, track failure modes were identiﬁed as well as the amount
of corrective time necessary to make repairs. He was consulted to determine
the ease of detection of the failure modes using standard inspection methods.
From the operations department, a data log of track failures was collected to
correlate the failure modes with average train delay time. This enabled the
determination of the severity of each failure mode. Failure occurrence ﬁgures
were obtained from the incident data sheet for perway in the Western Cape,
supplied by PRASA head oﬃce. The RPN tables for occurrence, severity and
detection evaluation are presented in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 respectively.
Multiple failure modes were considered from both the incident and work
order databases. These databases pertain to any incident aﬀecting the op-
eration of trains and maintenance work conducted on the track at PRASA.
Incidents with failure modes that have negligible severity in terms of train
delay or disruption were omitted from the list. A ﬁnal list of perway failure
modes was created and is presented in Table 3.1. Note that for entries with the
same RPN, the detection value is omitted to determine priority for ranking.
This RPN ranking of failure modes is a ﬁrst attempt to understand the critical
perway failures of the Western Cape passenger rail network.
3.4 Root cause analysis
Perway failure modes from the FMECA were investigated for probable causes
of failure and tree diagrams were constructed for each failure mode. A list of
root causes for each failure mode was created from the FTA, as a collection
of key problems to be solved by track maintenance. This list of root causes
provides a means to identify maintenance tasks which prevent critical perway
failure modes. An example of a fault tree for rail breaks is provided in Fig.
3.5. From the identiﬁed root causes, current maintenance tasks were better
understood and new maintenance tasks were identiﬁed that are of preventa-
tive nature. These tasks can be applied in conjunction with a preventative
maintenance strategy, which identiﬁes problems before they become critical
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Table 3.1: RPN table for railway perway failure modes (Chin et al., 2009), (Xu
et al., 2002).
Failure mode Occurrence Detection Severity RPN
Missing rail clips 9 8 8 576
Sand on track 7 8 8 448
Twist 9 7 7 441
Cracks 4 9 7 252
Faulty block joint 9 7 4 252
Skid marks 6 8 5 240
Broken crossing (frog) 9 3 8 216
Horizontal alignment 4 7 7 196
Broken rail crown 5 5 7 175
Dirty ballast 6 7 4 168
Wide/narrow gauge 7 3 7 147
Vertical alignment 3 7 7 147
Rail breaks 8 2 8 128
Slack in rail 8 4 4 128
Environmental damage 5 3 8 120
Broken crossing blade 7 2 8 112
Pantograph hook-up 7 2 7 98
Points not closing 7 2 7 98
Super elevation 2 7 7 98
Kick-out 6 2 8 96
Corrugation 4 3 8 96
Broken sleeper 6 4 4 96
Derailment 5 2 9 90
Side wear 4 3 7 84
Obstruction 6 2 6 72
Rust 4 2 7 56
Points overlap 6 3 3 54
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and, thus, create a platform for prevention through maintenance. Valuable
current maintenance practises can be used in accordance with preventative
maintenance to ensure that the most eﬃcient and cost eﬀective maintenance
is conducted. This root cause analysis study proves that knowing what to
maintain due to insight into perway reliability has a practical outworking into
maintenance tasks. This allows a maintenance engineer to maintain unreliable
track sections as there are possible maintenance practices that he/she can em-
ploy to bring track sections back to a reliable state.
The researcher argues here that the problem with the current track main-
tenance is not only that the best maintenance tasks are not being done, but
also not being done at the optimal time while the priority for maintenance
tasks remains unclear. The lack of priority leads to lack of vision with re-
gard to eﬀective maintenance. The result of this blurred vision is corrective
maintenance, which is an intensive maintenance strategy. To avoid this, the
researcher suggests reliability priority for track sections. If the maintenance
teams apply this to practise, certain maintenance tasks will continue as normal
but some tasks will be done on a priority basis, ensuring that maintenance is
conducted on unreliable track sections before reliable ones. Ultimately, the
cost will increase as thorough maintenance is conducted from track section to
track section but these will decrease when less sudden failures result because
maintenance occurs at the right place, at the right time. The service life of
assets will increase, thus, increasing asset utilisation, which reduces cost. Ta-
ble 3.2 was constructed by evaluating root causes and critical paths from the
FTA. From these, the researcher suggests possible preventative maintenance
tasks for the top ten failure modes in terms of risk. These tasks are proof that
a maintenance priority strategy is possible to execute. The fault trees for these
failure modes are presented in appendix B.
3.5 Risk matrix
A risk matrix is created to answer the question: `Which perway failures are go-
ing to have the highest impact on the operation of the train service and where
are these failures most likely to occur?' This question needs to be answered
in order to improve maintenance prioritisation of perway. The power of the
risk matrix is its statistical probability of survival of a perway corridor and
average train delay caused by a failure historically. This concept is similar to
the probability severity model created by Kumar et al. (2010), as discussed in
section 2.2.1. The probability aspect of this risk matrix predicts the chance
of a failure occurring on the track section, which increases as time progresses
from last failure. The average historical delay provides an estimate of severity
for a potential failure. With this information, one can rank perway corridors
according to a risk metric, which in eﬀect, stipulates the likelihood and severity
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Figure 3.5: Fault tree for rail break failure mode.
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Table 3.2: Identiﬁed preventative maintenance actions for ten speciﬁed failure
modes.
Failure mode Possible preventative maintenance action
Missing rail clips Regular inspection, replace clips before reports,
anti-theft installations.
Sand on track Wind breakers at hot spots, regular clearing.
Twist Regular inspection, sleeper checks,
ballast checks, tamping and packing.
Cracks Regular inspection, grinding, welding,
quality check incoming rails, coat rails.
Faulty block joint Regular cleaning, regular inspection,
install bolts, remove cracked units.
Skid marks Quality check incoming rails,
observe during foot patrols.
Broken crossing Regular inspection, replace parts before reports,
check for cracks.
Horizontal alignment Regular inspection, sleeper checks,
ballast checks, tamping and packing.
Broken rail crown Regular grinding, correct geometry defects,
replace rail before critical.
Dirty ballast Remove and replace ballast, tamp ballast,
repack subgrade.
of failures occurring in that corridor. If the pareto principle is indeed correct,
then 20% of all the track corridors will be causing 80% of the delay and the
risk matrix makes the identiﬁcation of these corridors possible. The discussed
matrix is presented in Fig. 3.6.
The probability of survival discussed above is the reliability of a perway
corridor. This means that the likelihood arm (vertical scale) of the risk matrix
is speciﬁed by the reliability performance of a perway corridor. The higher the
reliability of the perway corridor the lower the likelihood of failure gets. Thus,
the reliability performance of a perway corridor is interpreted as the predicted
number of days from the last failure until the reliability has degraded to 90%.
This 90% is the expected perway achievement by the operations department
at PRASA. So, the reliability performance is measured by the amount of time,
within which the system is able to maintain a satisfactory reliability level for
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY: PRASA INFRASTRUCTURE MAINTENANCE
PRIORITY USING RISK AND RELIABILITY 64
Figure 3.6: Risk matrix model for perway maintenance prioritisation.
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operations. The lower the number of days, the faster the system degrades
to the 90% level. This degradation is expressed as a factor, 1/days so that
the risk level increases with an increasing number of 1/days (as the likelihood
increases, so must the risk). The 1/days scale is sensitive and so the range
can be adjusted if required. On the horizontal scale of the risk matrix is the
average delay minutes per incident for a track corridor. The average network
delay per failure mode is calculated by taking the delay per incident from op-
erations reports and averaging them for a time period. When analysing the
failure statistics for a track corridor, the average delay per failure mode can
be applied to each type of failure in the record and, thus, an expected delay is
calculated. A short range is applied to the expected delay in the risk matrix
as the values represent averages and, therefore, would not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from each other. The values entered into the exemplar matrix provide an es-
timate of what a populated matrix would look like. The risk categories in
the matrix are deﬁned according to Markowski and Mannan (2008), in Fig.
2.18. The hard matrix style is preferred as the top level categories in an easy
matrix would be unpopulated in this risk analysis as the majority of data is
expected to fall in the middle and lower tiers of the matrix. Fig. 3.6 describes
an exemplar maintenance plan for each matrix category. The more critical
the risk, the more extensive the maintenance, when focus is on maintenance
that makes measurable improvement on the reliability of a perway corridor. An
example calculation is provided to explain how the matrix entries are obtained.
From Nov 2008 - Nov 2014, the track corridor between Kalk Bay and Fish
Hoek experienced failures due to consecutive missing rail clips and faulty block
joints. An average network delay for each of the two failure modes was cal-
culated from operations reports and adjusted by information received by the
Metrorail Cape Town track inspector. There were eight counts of rail clip
faults and each count caused an average delay of 150 minutes in addition to
four counts of block joint faults, of which each caused an average delay of 20
minutes. The average corridor delay is then (8 × 150 + 4 × 20)/12 = 106.7
minutes. Statistical analysis indicates that it takes the corridor 31 days to
degrade to 90% reliability, thus, from the risk matrix, the risk factor is 3.4
min/day. This means that with every passing day, a theoretical 3.4 minutes
are added on, assuming that a failure occurs as the perway reliability standard
drops below the required operating condition of 90%. An explanation of risk
categories is provided in chapter 6.
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Data Analysis
Data analysis involves the cleaning of raw data and input into developed mod-
els to produce the desired output. The developed reliability model and severity
calculations for train delay are tested by evaluating actual failure data and de-
termining statistical trends from it. The purpose of the data analysis chapter
is to demonstrate that theory on failure statistics can be applied to the case
study in order to calculate reliability for perway corridors. Further, it is impor-
tant that the severity of failure modes is realistic, which is conﬁrmed through
analysis. A single perway corridor is mostly studied for the purposes of detailed
discussion.
4.1 Data sets
A thorough data set study was conducted on the available maintenance failure
data at PRASA Infrastructure to understand how maintenance and failures
are tracked. Three databases were considered; namely, the events log, work
order database and perway asset register from November 2008 to January
2014. The assets in the register are current as of the year 2015. The ob-
jective of this data study was to create a sortable and clean data-set for all
maintenance events, which is a combination of the clean events log and work
orders databases. From the clean data, failure trends could be predicted for
the rest of 2014, into 2015. The events log is a database for perway failures
that aﬀected the operation of trains. This resulted in track maintenance per-
sonnel conducting work such that regular service was restored. This list gives
a good indication of what failures caused an interruption in the train service.
The work order database is important as it contains maintenance information
for the condition-based restoration of track geometry parameters, which are
indicators for perway failure modes that will not be recognised by operations.
Dirty ballast and any track replacements are identiﬁed through the work order
database. The track renewals are important when the events and work order
databases are combined as a change in an observed reliability trend could have
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Figure 4.1: Line map extract of the Metrorail perway network.
been caused by a major event. A major event could be extensive renewals,
rendering the data for reliability analysis unusable up until the change. When
a perway failure event occurs, the train station that is geographically closest to
the failure is logged as the location of the failure in the events log. In addition,
a kilometre marker is recorded, which is the equivalent of co-ordinates in the
perway domain. An asset tag is assigned to the failure, in accordance with the
assets speciﬁed in the asset register.
The asset register was designed to trace every section of perway such that
the location of a perway failure is identiﬁed. Each asset is described by a line
code, an asset type and an asset number for the asset type. The asset register
additionally has kilometre markings for each asset. The kilometre marking
system only works in accordance with a line code that speciﬁes the major line
on which the asset is located. For example, KM 10.400 exists on the Wetton
- Ottery track corridor as well as the Netreg - Heideveld track corridor. The
diﬀerence between them is that the Wetton - Ottery corridor is on the Cape
Flats line, which has line code JN whereas the Netreg - Heideveld corridor has
line code MD. The limitation of the asset register is that it is not immedi-
ately obvious between which train stations the asset is found. Consequently,
the researcher consulted a line map and updated the asset register by linking
the kilometre markings and line codes from the asset register to the line map
presented in Fig. 4.1. Only an extract of the line map is presented here.
As not every perway event is logged with complete data, a secondary
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Figure 4.2: Combined work order and events database extract between Fish Hoek
and Kalk Bay.
database (asset register) was manipulated to unlock hidden information in
the primary database (events log) for the recovery of omitted necessary infor-
mation. This data manipulation is an example of data cleaning where there is
missing data, as shown in Fig. 2.14. In this instance, the missing data can be
retrieved. Fig. 4.2 provides an extract from the combined events and mainte-
nance data-set along the Fish Hoek - Kalk Bay track corridor. An asset tag
of 1M is observed in the extract. After investigation, it was uncovered that
instead of assigning an asset tag during the work order by the maintenance
personnel, a general tag was assigned to this asset. This general tag sometimes
makes it impossible to distinguish which one of two track corridors the asset
is in. Assumptions have to be made for the placement of this asset. To clean
the database to the observed state, duplicate data entries had to be removed.
Many description cells contained multiple entries in one which were split by a
cell to column algorithm. IF and FIND Excel function algorithms were created
to sort the descriptions into keywords which represent failure modes. This is
how failure mode entries were tracked.
4.2 Reliability methods applied
The entire Metrorail perway network is one large system of interconnected
tracks, all working to serve for eﬀective public transport for the greater Cape
Town area. The perway failures in the system as a whole were observed to
better understand what characteristics occur in the many perway corridors
that make-up the network at large. Fig. 4.3 presents the number of perway
failures per year for the entire network, from January 2008 - November 2014.
The failures increase from 268 per year in 2008 to 545 in 2014. The failure
rate in 2014 is more than double of that in 2008. From eyeball analysis,
it seems that the system as a whole observes an increasing trend; meaning
that the reliability of the network is deteriorating. This is most likely due to
maintenance that is not preventively focused. It seems that maintenance is
not improving the reliability of systems indicating that perway corridors are
more likely to experience an increasing trend as opposed to a decreasing one.
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Figure 4.3: Number of perway failures for Metrorail Cape Town.
A non-committal trend is also likely but not as likely as an increasing one.
The cumulative number of failures for the network was plotted against time
for the period discussed. This type of graph is a good trend indicator and is a
standard tool used when ﬁtting a model to failure data, although this method
is applied here purely as a speculative tool. The Laplace test was applied to
the data and a statistic of 13.04 resulted, which indicates a heavily increasing
trend. The power law and log linear models were ﬁt to the data to determine
which was the best ﬁt. Using the power law, there is a 66% chance that a
failure will occur within the ﬁrst day of operation of the system after its last
recorded failure. Although some error may factor into the large scale of this
analysis, an initial understanding of the vastness of Metrorail's perway network
has been conceptualised. One could argue that this chance of failure used to
be less, by taking a train ride from Stellenbosch to Cape Town. A passenger
worries that the journey takes almost twice as long as it did ﬁve years ago and
ponders what has changed that the experience has worsened.
4.2.1 Analysis of a single perway corridor
Repairable system theory can be applied to any perway section that has four
or more failures and no full shed maintenance upsets for that corridor. Mainte-
nance has an eﬀect on reliability which is diﬃcult to quantify, meaning that any
model for reliability includes the eﬀects of historical maintenance. With more
failures present, trends in data become obvious because precision increases.
Thus, a track corridor was sought that had a higher number of failures. High
traﬃc routes such as Cape Town - Woodstock and Belville - Tygerberg, as
shown in Fig. 3.1, were not considered for analysis. This is because a reason-
ably small percentage of recorded failures for each track corridor were assigned
to a general asset tag and the location for these assets was not determinable
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for these cases. Now, to trace a failure to a track corridor, it must ﬁrst be
determined between which train stations the failure took place, then on which
coded line the failure took place and, ﬁnally, whether the failure occurred on
the up traﬃc or down traﬃc direction of track within the coded line. For
a corridor such as Cape Town - Woodstock, there are four coded lines, each
with an up line and down line. Thus, any perway failure between these points
could have occurred on one of eight sections of track. For such data, estimat-
ing the location of failure is next to impossible for busy track corridors and
errors are inevitable in this set up. As this error cannot be ignored, sections
where smaller errors are present are preferred for analysis. The Simonstown
- Glencairn track corridor was selected due to its poor perway condition and
single multi-directional traﬃc line.
The researcher acquired TQI data for the Metrorail perway network and it
was discovered that the Fish Hoek - Simonstown track corridor, consisting of
four train stations, had the worst recorded TQI of any track corridor between
January 2009 and December 2013. This 2.71km corridor measured an average
TQI of 19.5, which is far above the 7.5 threshold for mainline tracks. The
locations of failures for this corridor were identiﬁed using a decision support
diagram presented in Fig. 4.4. This track corridor had the most recorded
perway failures of any of the nearby corridors, which sparked the interest of
the researcher. Understanding the reliability trends of such a perway corridor
would shed some light to unveil the characteristics of tracks that deviate far
from their design conditions. The events and work order database entries were
scrutinised for all assets within the Simonstown - Glencairn perway corridor.
Two duplicate entries were removed as well as any other perway failures result-
ing from obstructions and environmental eﬀects such as sand on tracks. No
component theft was experienced on this track corridor. A few track replace-
ments were recorded, as well as welding and some localised tamping on tracks.
Very little TQI improvement was recorded at any stage during the 2009 - 2013
period, which conﬁrms that only localised maintenance was conducted. The
NHPP model is perfect for this scenario as it assumes that the reliability of
the corridor will remain largely intact when such localised maintenance is con-
ducted, which is much the same as the car's reliability when you change a tyre.
On the 5th of May 2011, a gauge repair was conducted due to extremely poor
gauge measurements on track asset JM/CUR026. This failure event, although
slightly delayed in its recording, was added to the data set. Train drivers gen-
erally report heavy vibrations caused by such track geometric deviations and
then repair work is logged in the work orders database.
The cleaned data set for the Simonstown - Glencairn perway corridor was
modelled as a set of arrival times of a repairable system. The corridor is rep-
resented by a string of assets each in respective sockets, as discussed in section
2.8. As this perway corridor only has a single line between the two stations, its
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Figure 4.4: Decision support diagram for the location identiﬁcation of perway
failure events.
reliability is represented by one of the reliability model arms, presented in Fig.
3.3. For this model, unpredictable failures resulting from theft, environment
and obstruction were excluded because they are not caused by track degrada-
tion and, thus, would skew the model. The arrival times of perway failures are
as follows:
249, 501, 1158, 1697, 1979, 2084, 2089, 2101, 2133, 2167, 2175, 2187, 2285,
2328, 2420 (days).
The data was left truncated to remove any uncertainty that arises when the
last failure event before the start of recording is unknown. As there was plenty
of data available for trend estimation, time zero was recorded from 3 February
2008 instead of 2 January 2008 when failure data recording began. The data
was right truncated as well, as the last failure occurred on the 17th of October
2014, close to 1 November 2014 when the last available data was collected. Any
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative failure against time for the Simonstown - Glencairn perway
corridor.
trends were thus plotted from failure to failure, similar to a case when suspen-
sions are assumed at the beginning and end of data-sets to simplify analysis.
A cumulative failure against time plot was constructed to visualise the failure
trend of the data, presented in Fig. 4.5. For the ﬁrst 1200 days of analy-
sis, a decreasing trend is prevalent for the data. The trend gradually changes
around this time, where failures occurred more and more rapidly. At around
time 2000, the increase experiences a rapid jump. The initial jump eventually
eases oﬀ slightly. It is evident that the dataset exhibits three distinct periods
each with a diﬀerent trend. Nothing extraordinary happened at time 2000 in
terms of maintenance that could have upset the trend, according to the work
order database. The general trend for the entire time history resembles the
eﬀect of deformation of an object when it encounters a load. Such an object
seems to be healthy under initial small elastic deformation, but under heavier
loads, clearly begins to deteriorate. As plastic deformation of the object is
experienced, the object exponentially deteriorates. If the perway failure trend
loosely follows track condition, a critical condition must have been reached
around time 2000. Eﬀective preventative perway maintenance is important,
to avoid such deterioration. PRASA currently uses a MTBF to account for
reliability in their perway network. For this corridor, the estimated MTBF is
202 days. The error of comparing this value with other perway corridors for
maintenance planning is that the MTBF ignores the trend that is observed
from the data. The MTBF is likely to underestimate the failure rate for the
data in this case. A more intelligent analysis is necessary to predict the relia-
bility of the corridor.
A Laplace statistic of +3.13 was calculated from the Laplace trend test,
which indicates a heavily increasing trend. This result is in accordance with
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Figure 4.6: Log-linear and power law model ﬁt to failure data from the Simonstown
- Glencairn perway corridor.
eyeball analysis and ﬁts the general trend for perway corridors for the entire
Metrorail network. Fig. 2.16 indicates that an NHPP model can be ﬁt to this
data. A power law or log linear model is suitable for ﬁt, although the best of
the ﬁts will model the data to ensure goodness of ﬁt. The MLE method and
the LSE methods were tested on multiple data sets but the MLE estimates
seemed crude compared to LSE estimates, thus only the LSE was continued.
The log linear least squares estimation produced parameters α0 = −8.26902
and α1 = 0.001992. The R2 value for these parameters is 92.4%. The power
law least squares estimation produced parameters λ = 4.669 × 10−9 and
β = 2.7963, with an R2 value of 89.8%. The log linear model seems to rep-
resent what actually happened to the system better than the power law. The
graphical ﬁts are presented in Fig. 4.6. It is clear from the graphic that the
expected values from log linear model are closer to the observed values than
the power law ﬁt, especially for N = 4 and up. Until at least t = 2000, the
power law model doesn't accurately ﬁt the observed failures which makes it
an undesirable choice when compared to the log linear model. Goodness of ﬁt
for four other perway corridors is presented in appendix C.
A linear estimation method by Crowder et al. (1994) is applied to both
log linear and power law models to conﬁrm R2 results. Fig. 4.7 presents the
linearised ROCOF form for log linear and power law models. The estimates in
time were made for the mean time of each selected estimated interval, which
explains each point on the respective graphs. This method provides the same
argument as the coeﬃcient of determination, which shows that literature sup-
ports R2 comparisons. The log linear model is clearly the most linear of the
two models. Linear estimation for four other perway corridors is presented in
appendix D.
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Figure 4.7: Estimated ROCOF for a) log linear and b) power law models.
Conﬁdence bounds were placed around the ROCOF estimates for both log
linear and power law models, ρ1 and ρ2 respectively. The Fisher information
matrix allows the calculation of these bounds, which provides conﬁdence for
a model ﬁt and future predictions (section 2.14.1). These bands give an in-
dication of the likelihood that the actual ROCOF, which has been estimated,
falls inside the bound region. The 95% conﬁdence bounds for log linear and
power law models are presented in Fig. 4.8. The power law model has tighter
bounds at the end of the observation period which indicates that predictions
from the power law model can be made with more accuracy. Although this
is true, it would be erroneous to conclude that the power law is the better
model from this comparison as the conﬁdence does not include the goodness
of model ﬁt based on regression. Although the power law model provides more
conﬁdence, the log linear model is chosen as it is a more accurate model of the
observed data. Conﬁdence bands were applied to the ROCOF of four other
perway corridors in appendix E.
Section 3.5 discusses that the operations target for perway reliability is 90%.
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Figure 4.8: ROCOF with 95% upper and lower conﬁdence bounds for a) log linear
and b) power law models.
Equations 2.18 and 2.21 calculate the reliability over the interval t1 to t2. The
model exists to predict the future reliability, and so reliability is calculated from
the time of last failure, t1 = 2420 onwards. The reliability against time curves
are plotted for the log linear and power law ﬁts for the ﬁrst 150 days after the
last failure. These curves are presented in Fig. 4.9. The reliability predictions
for both ﬁts are close enough to each other to provide conﬁrmation that the
reliability is representative of the data. The reliability from the log linear ﬁt
falls more steeply than the power law model. 90% reliability is experienced
after 3.3 days of operation for the log linear ﬁt and after 6.7 days for the
power law model. As the log linear model provides the best ﬁt, it is conﬁrmed
that a reliability of 90+% can be maintained for only three days after the
last failure. A poor reliability was expected as this perway corridor has the
worst condition of any other in the perway network, according to TQI. This
low reliability is justiﬁed in the following section. Operations cannot eﬀectively
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS 76
Figure 4.9: Reliability of power law and log linear models for the perway failures
of the Simonstown - Glencairn corridor.
schedule for this perway corridor as the reliability is so poor. Extensive renewal
is recommended.
4.2.2 Scrutiny of system reliability
Keeping perway at a high reliability through maintenance is a complex chal-
lenge, considering that perway covers a large geographical area. It is diﬃcult to
track the changes in reliability due to maintenance when sparse maintenance is
conducted. Reliability tracking is only possible if maintenance is conducted on
all sets of failure mode speciﬁc components for which an estimated increase in
reliability is calculated. It is further diﬃcult to build redundancy into the sys-
tem as infrastructure requires large capital expenditure and redundancy adds
signiﬁcantly to that cost. The current perway network has some redundancy
at component level, by adding in more sleepers and rail clips than necessary
for operation. Rails lack redundancy, which is why they are one of the primary
causes of risk in a railway network. The only way to add rail redundancy is
to build additional track sections in the direction of train travel, which is not
cost eﬃcient. The current state of railway infrastructure is a single direction
perway corridor, which is the only possible traﬃc route. This corridor is a
series connection of perway assets. If any one of these assets fail, train traﬃc
ceases until the asset is restored. The Simonstown - Glencairn corridor has 18
perway assets on its main line. Assuming that each asset was brand new and
the reliability of each asset degrades evenly, the following trend presented in
Fig. 4.10 would occur. The system reliability decreases exponentially as the
reliability of each asset decreases. This means that the reliability of each asset
needs to be maintained at a high standard to avoid rapid deterioration at a
system level. If all the assets have a reliability of 95%, then the system relia-
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Figure 4.10: Theoretical degradation of system reliability with asset reliability for
Simonstown - Glencairn perway corridor.
bility is 0.9518 = 40% at a moment in time. If all the assets except one have
a reliability of 95% and that single asset has a reliability of 10%, the system
reliability drops to 4%. The diﬀerence between 40% and 4% is determined by
just one asset. In reality, new assets and old ones would be mixed together
at any given time due to replacements. Thankfully, because the service life of
railway components is generally 20 years, system reliability is manageable for
shorter time horizons. For a poor condition perway corridor such as Simon-
stown - Glencairn, the state of reliability is understood by the system against
asset trend presented.
4.3 Pareto analysis of perway failure mode
severity
The Pareto principle states that 80% of eﬀects come from 20% of causes. This
principle is applied to severity of perway failures, which is understood through
the train delay they cause to the railway network for the period of January
2008 to November 2014. More severe perway failures require immediate track
closure while less severe failures allow the train service to continue with an
applied speed restriction. Diﬀerent network delay results from each of these
instances. The Pareto diagram of Fig. 4.11 presents the estimated network
delay time for each failure mode based on the delay minutes caused by each
in operations records.
The top six events in the Pareto analysis are supposed to cause 80% of delay
time. The total recorded delay time over this period, according to Metrorail,
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Figure 4.11: Pareto diagram of train delay caused by each perway failure mode.
is approximately 350 000 minutes. The researcher tracked 322 449 delay min-
utes, which is not a far-oﬀ recorded value. The deviation is the result of a
sample being taken from operations reports to calculate the average delay of
each failure mode, which has a small deviation from the population of failures.
Metrorail has a clerk who records total failure minutes, which is what the re-
searcher's calculations are compared to. The top six failure modes cause 77%
of the total failure time, which is in accordance with the Pareto principle. The
reasons for the high delay for the top six failure modes are explained. Careful
attention is paid to these failure modes as they are principle causers of perway
unreliability and also possibly deterioration of track.
Crossing delay minutes are high because they account for 320/2524 recorded
events, which produced an occurrence value of 9 towards its RPN. This, in ad-
dition with the 230 minutes average delay expected from such an event gives
it a high delay ranking. Its high delay results from the urgency of repair for
such an event. If there is rail damage at a crossing, train delay risk is high as
this is where a train changes from one set of tracks to another. Grinding and
welding is often needed for such a repair, which adds waiting time until a repair
can commence. The rail clip failures are high as they account for 450/2524
events. Normally, a rail clip failure wouldn't be extremely critical but these
recorded failures are a result of theft, for which 50+ clips can be stolen at
a time. With such a large number of consecutive missing clips, the rail can
easily kick out; causing large stresses in the rail, rail breaks and an unsuitable
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channel for a train to travel on. The 150 minutes of average delay are a result
of immediate track closure and because such faults are often only found in the
morning during peak traﬃc, after theft from the night before. Twist repairs
result from maintenance which has been planned, speciﬁcally when twist ge-
ometric track parameters exceed their operational limit. 303 of these events
were recorded with 154 minutes expected delay for each. Recordings of twist
and gauge repairs dominate repairs over other known geometric parameters.
The researcher believes that the other track geometry maintenance events were
omitted as they are often repaired during twist maintenance. For these kinds
of failure modes, speed limits are initially placed on the perway corridor when
failure is identiﬁed. The next maintenance step is occupation of the perway,
which is out of peak traﬃc. Delay here is caused by the occupation taking
longer than scheduled and due to the reduction of network capacity due to the
line shut oﬀ. There are portions of the network with only a single line to pass
traﬃc. An occupation here causes large disruptions.
Broken rails account for 218/2524 events for which a delay is rated at 180
minutes. Rail breaks cause an immediate disruption of the train service and
no trains can pass over this section. A new rail has to be fetched from the
equipment stores and a welder is needed to help fasten the new rail onto the
section. As this is one of the most severe types of perway failure according
to logic, this justiﬁes the appearance of this failure mode in the top six. A
train pantograph hook-up usually takes a few hours to rewire. This is not
directly a perway fault but it requires occupation of perway to ﬁx. 80/2524
events recorded were pantograph hook-ups with an average delay of 141 min-
utes. Trains obviously can't pass while the electrics are down thus immediate
maintenance needs to be conducted for this failure mode. Blade repairs are
related to crossing repairs as they are the tip of the new connecting rail at a
switch and need to be intact to avoid train derailment. Blade repairs account
for 55/2524 events and have an average delay of 203 minutes. The high delay
is explained by the sudden discovery of the fault which leads to immediate oc-
cupation, taking a few hours as there is grinding and welding work necessary.
The top severity failure modes are justiﬁed and this builds conﬁdence for the
application of severity data to determine risk.
4.4 Risk matrix applied
The severity ranking for the Simonstown - Glencairn perway corridor was
calculated using the average delay per failure, explained in section 3.5 and the
number of days until 90% reliability. The average delay per failure is presented
in Table 4.1 for the corridor. Notice that there are common occurring failures
with small delay implications. If these were the only failures present then
one would conclude that if the eﬃciency of minor ﬁxes is improved, then
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maintenance problems would be solved for this corridor. This is not the case
here because multiple rail breaks are also present, as well as a derailment,
which has extremely severe consequences for network reliability. In addition,
this perway corridor deviates from design conditions with wide gauge problems.
The poor reliability of the corridor is worsened by the diversity of failure modes
experienced and by eyeball analysis, which seems to be shifting into a high risk
category.
Table 4.1: Failure modes and their average delay experienced on the Simonstown
- Glencairn perway corridor.
Arrival time (days) Failure mode Average delay (mins)
0 Block joint 19
249 Block joint 19
501 Broken rail 170
1158 Wide gauge 159
1697 Derailment 374
1979 Broken rail 170
2084 Block joint 19
2089 Block joint 19
2101 Broken rail 170
2133 Block joint 19
2167 Block joint 19
2175 Block joint 19
2187 Block joint 19
2285 Slack 15
2328 Block joint 19
2420 Slack 15
For the corridor, the average delay is 77.8 minutes and the reliability metric
3.3 days. That results in 23.6 minutes/day. The placement of the risk factor
on the risk matrix is presented in Fig. 4.12. The corridor ﬁts into the highest
risk maintenance category, which is desired. The corridor is unreliable and
it is in a bad condition. The maintenance decision that results from the risk
matrix is a complete overhaul on the corridor, which is the conclusion that
TQI and reliability information points to. As severe failures are part of the
unreliability of the track, the high risk status of this corridor is solidiﬁed. The
reason for the corridor risk not falling deep within the risk category, considering
its high risk is because it is not desired that many perway corridors fall into
this category. A complete perway overhaul costs millions of Rand and only
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Figure 4.12: Risk matrix for the Simonstown - Glencairn perway corridor.
very few of the perway corridors in the network can fall into this category.
The analysis conclusion is that the reliability-based risk method facilitates
the prioritisation of perway corridors for maintenance. The validation of this
method is presented in the following section.
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Results and Validation
The reliability analysis of a single perway corridor was extended to show that
there is consistency between reliability predictions when multiple perway cor-
ridors are compared. The analysis of these corridors is the pinnacle of the
research and presents the results of the topic. It is not enough to simply apply
the developed risk model to a real case, but validation of the model is necessary
to justify its continued use. Data from the condition tool TQI was correlated
to the developed risk comparison tool to show that extreme risk cases do relate
to extreme states of perway condition.
5.1 Reliability analysis of multiple perway
corridors
The failure data for ﬁve perway corridors was assessed for a recorded history
between January 2008 and November 2014. The names of the corridors are:
Simonstown - Glencairn, Kalk Bay - Fish Hoek (up), Philippi - Nyanga (up),
Maitland - Ndabeni (down) and Southﬁeld - Heathﬁeld (down). The ﬁve cor-
ridors were selected as they were independently assessed to have varying states
of condition, which is described later in the chapter. As condition information
was sometimes only available for the up or down line of the chosen corridors, it
was especially imperative that failure location was identiﬁed for each line. Ad-
ditional repairs for failure modes that do not form part of the events log were
added to the failure history of each corridor from the work orders database.
No extensive renewals were reported for any of the corridors. Each perway
corridor trend analysis was conducted from the ﬁrst failure in the time enve-
lope that data was recorded in. The time intervals for each perway corridor
are presented in Fig. 5.1. First failures for Philippi and Maitland occurred
fairly late in the recorded time envelope. The time from the previous failures
was uncertain as there was some doubt that a failure could not have occurred
for such a long period of time for each instance. The inter-arrival time for such
a failure in the Maitland case would be 1132+ days, which is almost twice any
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Figure 5.1: Time intervals over which trends were established for ﬁve perway track
corridors.
other inter-arrival time recorded for that system. In addition, analysing the
failure trend without being able to assume a failure at the beginning of the
period skews trend tests as the ﬁrst arrival time cannot be accurately speciﬁed,
especially for such a long initial arrival time. For these reasons, the system was
only analysed from the ﬁrst recorded failure for these two perway corridors.
The ﬁgure depicts times at which reliability prediction began for each system.
To ensure consistency between each corridor for the purposes of analysis, it
was decided that the time period for reliability predictions is relative to the
time of the last failure in the perway corridors. In other words, systems are
not compared in real time, but rather by their reliability performance after
their last recorded failure. This time is donated +t. The end times for system
analysis were all within one month of each other thus old reliability trends
were not compared with new trends.
Each of the ﬁve perway corridors is a repairable system. Fig. 2.16 is
consulted to guide the evaluation of model determination for these repairable
systems. According to the ﬁgure, data ﬁrst needs to be tested for trend to
estimate its dependence and determine whether it displays identical behaviour
or not. The Laplace trend test was conducted, which only provided assurance
that one of the ﬁve systems displayed a trend (section 2.11.1). A second test,
the Lewis-Robinson test was conducted and from this test, a trend was identi-
ﬁed for the other four perway corridor failures. Other trend tests such as the
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Mann and Military Handbook tests were not needed for this analysis. All ﬁve
systems displayed an increasing trend. Table 5.1 summarises these ﬁndings.
High ULR statistics from the table are evident due to the large variance expe-
rienced by each dataset. The large variance conﬁrms that data is not identical
and will therefore tend away from a HPP model. The least squares for each
system produced the parameters discussed in the table and revealed a pre-
ferred form of the NHPP model, according to the coeﬃcient of determination.
Both power law and log linear models were made useful in this analysis.
Table 5.1: Trend testing and curve ﬁtting for ﬁve perway corridors.
Perway U ULR Reliability Model Parameters
corridor characteristic
Simonstown +3.13 - Degradation Log-linear α0 = -8.269
α1 = 1.9× 10−3
Kalk Bay +1.11 +3.34 Degradation Log-linear α0 = -6.739
α1 = 1.1× 10−3
Philippi +1.51 +4.44 Degradation Power law λ = 1.1× 10−5
β = 1.829
Maitland +1.11 +4.37 Degradation Power law λ = 7.2× 10−6
β = 1.874
Southﬁeld +1.32 +3.84 Degradation Log-linear α0 = -7.830
α1 = 1.3× 10−3
Reliability against time plots for each perway corridor are compared in Fig.
5.2. Remember that each system is in its own time window but these systems
are compared on the same time axis for the purpose of maintenance priori-
tisation. The graphic illustrates a spectrum of reliability degradation from
the poor Simonstown case to the seemingly more stable Southﬁeld corridor.
The diﬀerence in reliability for perway corridors is an indication that there is
room for maintenance prioritisation to improve corridors with weak reliability
performance. This spectrum is contained within reasonable limits which is an
indication that the analysis has strength. It is important to understand how
long it takes each system to degrade to 90% reliability as operations requires
perway to perform with 90+% reliability. Whether this expectation is real-
istic or not considering present perway condition is a separate matter. The
Simonstown - Glencairn corridor degrades to 90% reliability in 3.3 days. This
is followed by 7.4 days for the Kalk Bay - Fish Hoek corridor, 10.2 days for
Philippi - Langa, 10.5 days for Maitland - Nyanaga and 16.2 days for Southﬁeld
- Heathﬁeld.
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Figure 5.2: Reliability against time for ﬁve perway corridors in the Metrorail Cape
Town network.
5.2 Risk analysis of multiple perway corridors
The risk metric for each of the ﬁve perway corridors is calculated in the same
way as the Simonstown - Glencairn corridor from section 4.4. The Simonstown
corridor metric was calculated as 77.8 mins/3.3 days = 23.6 mins/day. Fol-
lowing, Kalk Bay at 103.5 mins/7.4 days = 14.0 mins/day; Philippi at 79.7
mins/10.2 days = 7.8 mins/day. Maitland is 70 mins/10.5 days = 6.7 mins/day
and ﬁnally Southﬁeld at 75 mins/16.2 days = 4.6 mins/day. The failure count
for each corridor is dominated by failures that cause less delay, as the asset
failures that caused these delays generally have a shorter lifetime. For in-
stance, a rail life is approximately twenty years but a block joint's life is much
shorter, causing more frequent service disruptions due to an asset like broken
block joints. In this way, there is enough variation in the average delay of each
system to observe that some of the systems have long delay assets that fail
frequently. These systems are surely severe cases for maintenance that should
be addressed more urgently. One must be careful not to assume that because
the average delay for the corridor is high, that the corridor experiences many
high severity failures. For instance, a corridor may have experienced four rail
breaks and one section with slack. This might indicate that the section con-
tains rails that were installed with poor quality but the rest of the corridor
may operate eﬃciently. The combined eﬀect of reliability and average delay
is presented in Fig. 5.3, in which the ﬁve corridors are ranked in the risk matrix.
The calculated risk metrics fell into three out of the four risk categories.
The last, unused risk category (green) was designed for systems that exhibit
reliability improvement or that have not experienced enough failures to express
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Figure 5.3: Risk matrix for the comparison of ﬁve perway corridors in the Metrorail
Cape Town network.
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a reliability trend. One may argue that the more years, for which data is avail-
able, the less systems will fall into the green category. In reality, systems are
expected to be refurbished on a ﬁve to ten year time horizon which limits the
number of failures available for trend analysis. A condition estimate for the
track corridor must correlate with systems that exhibit less than four failures,
the minimum needed for trend analysis.
As expected, the Simonstown corridor presents the highest risk. This risk
category identiﬁes perway corridors for which train service should not con-
tinue. After observing the failure modes for the corridor; derailments, broken
rails, slacks and condition problems were encountered. This means that the
poor reliability experienced cannot simply be solved by maintaining assets to
prevent one or two critical failure modes. The only way to replenish the sur-
vivability of this system is to freshly install new perway. After the analysis was
completed, the researcher discovered that a maintenance decision was made by
Metrorail Cape Town to close down the Simonstown - Glencairn perway and
refurbish it, as predicted by the risk matrix. This replenishment began in 2015
after 1 November 2014, the time when the failure observation period ended.
This event is a real life example of the use of the risk matrix. The Kalk Bay -
Fish Hoek corridor fell into the yellow risk category, which is focused on miti-
gating critical failure modes to reduce system risk. Here, components relating
to the failure mode are fully serviced. The failures experienced were mainly
caused by gauge, kickout and block joint problems. As gauge and kickout are
problems related to rail fasteners, the potential maintenance solutions were
narrowed down. Block joints are fairly standard to service. These types of
failures justiﬁed the speciﬁcation of the risk category and explains the eﬀect of
reliability and severity on levels of risk in a practical maintenance environment.
When it was observed that Maitland - Ndabeni and Philippi - Nyanga
corridors obtained similar risk metrics, the same failure characteristics were
expected from each system. Both corridors experienced mixed failure modes,
with dominant failures occurring due to broken block joints in each case. As
Maitland and Philippi corridors are close to the dividing line between risk cat-
egories on the matrix, the question arises: `what should be done for borderline
cases?' As the risk matrix is a decision support tool, it is imperative that
decisions made from the risk matrix are conﬁrmed by evidence from obser-
vations. For example, it would be wise to conduct preventative maintenance
on the block joints for Maitland and Simonstown, which is an action speciﬁed
by the yellow risk category. On the other hand, if the maintenance sched-
ule is too tight, Maitland and Philippi would be the ﬁrst corridors to have
preventative maintenance overlooked. As for Southﬁeld, the sparse risk re-
newal category is encountered. When failures or faults are encountered during
planned maintenance in this category, renewals are conducted. This is due
to the low regularity of maintenance for these corridors. It is better to fully
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renew damaged components when maintenance on the component is not likely
to occur again soon. Failures for Southﬁeld were centred around points at
railway switches that needed to be packed to align the track correctly as well
and broken block joints. This implies that new points blades might need to
be installed at local failure sites. The majority of maintenance conducted in
the green risk category is servicing, such as oiling parts and tightening loose
connections.
The risk matrix does not only exist for preventative maintenance decisions
but for condition based maintenance as well. The risk metrics allow sequential
ordering of risk which provides a queuing solution for condition based main-
tenance jobs. The tamping of railway tracks is conducted on a priority basis.
The current prioritisation tool for this kind of maintenance is TQI. The risk
metric will then correlate with TQI to gain additional conﬁdence for prioritisa-
tion of tamping jobs. The risk metric changes the deﬁnition of where tamping
is necessary by suggesting that tamping may be required to reduce risk, even
if the current track condition is not in a critical state. For example, the ballast
in a perway corridor may be poor in localised areas, which causes slack of the
rail between sleepers. This slack generates risk for the perway corridor, but
the TQI of the corridor is fairly low relative to other corridors. In this situa-
tion, the risk tool picks up faults where TQI was not able to and it provides a
clearer understanding of where maintenance is needed.
5.3 Validation of risk matrix
A validation has been performed in part in the previous chapter, by explaining
how the matrix sheds light on current maintenance decisions for ﬁve perway
corridors. It was further shown that recommendations from the risk matrix
were accurate for the Simonstown - Glencairn corridor, as a full renewal plan
is in action. For further validation, it is shown that the risk matrix has a
relationship with the TQI metric that is used to assess the condition of per-
way corridors. When the ﬁve systems were analysed, failure modes caused by
anomalies that are external to perway degradation were excluded from failure
analysis. For cases such as rail clip theft and sand on tracks, it is possible to ge-
ographically plot these failure modes to determine which areas experience the
most service delay as a result of these factors. The locational model described
is a separate model from maintenance management of perway deterioration.
As a result of the exclusion of external failure modes, the condition of a given
corridor should more closely correlate with the risk of the corridor. This is be-
cause perway condition degradation occurs in conjunction with an increase in
the number of failures of perway components. For this reason the ﬁve chosen
corridors were analysed as they are extremes cases in the TQI spectrum. The
TQI values for each corridor are presented in Table 5.2, remembering that 7.5
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is the highest TQI value recommended for mainline tracks (Zaayman, 2013).
TQI statistics were measured bi-annually between March 2009 and September
2013. This is not the exact time envelope over which failure data was captured
but it does represent ﬁve of the seven years for which failure data was captured.
TQI data from 2008 and 2014 was omitted due to lack of availability and an
assumption was made that the TQI data is representative of the failure data
as the sample size for TQI is not much diﬀerent from that of failure data. In
addition, the sample evenly spans across the population time envelope.
Table 5.2: TQI values and risk metrics for ﬁve perway corridors in the Metrorail
Cape Town network.
Corridor Risk metric TQI low TQI average TQI high
(mins/day)
Glencairn - Simonstown 23.6 17.9 19.5 22.2
Kalk Bay - Fish Hoek 14.0 10 10.4 11.1
Philippi - Nyanga 7.8 7.6 8.3 9.1
Maitland - Ndabeni 6.7 7.3 8.6 9.4
Southﬁeld - Heathﬁeld 4.6 6.1 6.4 6.7
Table 5.2 reveals high TQI values and low TQI, which are the highest
and lowest recorded TQI values for the corridor in the ﬁve year period. The
risk metric values decrease proportionally with TQI. The relationship is not
perfect between these metrics as there are obvious diﬀerences between them
but it does conﬁrm that risk metrics are in proportion to expected values.
Southﬁeld experiences some of the best TQI measurements in the Metrorail
network but these values for TQI are rather high by the industry standard.
The TQI values have increased as the system has aged, which conﬁrms that
the network is in a critical maintenance state. The risk matrix is designed for
maintenance prioritisation for this reason, to eliminate critical risks to shift
away from ﬁre-ﬁghting type maintenance. TQI not only provides a benchmark
for risk metrics, but additionally has sibilance to maintenance decisions made
from risk metrics. As the risk matrix is a decision support tool, it was not
designed to replace TQI but rather come alongside it to inform decisions made
and create fresh angles from which problems could be viewed. If it was the
same as TQI, it would be obsolete and if it didn't correlate in some way, it
would be invalid. Decisions from both tools overlapped for the Kalk Bay - Fish
Hoek corridor. The gauge TQI parameter reached a value of 2.0. There are
ﬁve geometric parameters for TQI and gauge is expected to be three times less
than other parameters as it represents heavily constrained geometry (rail clips,
sleepers and ballast). Rail clip fatigue is a typical cause for gauge deviation
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as the track is not being fastened with the required force. This is conﬁrmed
by Sadeghi and Askarinejad (2009). In this case, the risk-based decision to
maintain the critical gauge and kickout failure modes and thus replace rail
clips is the same decision that results from TQI measurement. The risk matrix
method is, in this way, validated both numerically and by case.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis of selected risk models
Although NHPP model selection is supported by statistical practise and lit-
erature, it is helpful to understand what reliability outputs are generated if
only a log linear or power law model was selected for all perway corridors
under analysis. This exercise depicts how sensitive reliability outputs are to
best model selection. Table 5.3 presents reliability and risk metrics for log
linear and power law models. These metrics are compared with the general
TQI trend between perway corridors to see the eﬀect of model selection on
validation. When comparing reliability metrics for both models, Simonstown
and Maitland have large variation in comparison to other perway corridors.
The log linear model always degrades faster than the power law model for
each corridor, which can be understood from a ROCOF graph. The log linear
model accurately captures the extremes of risk for diﬀerent perway corridors
but risk for Maitland is far higher than expected. In proportion to Kalk Bay,
Maitland should have a lower risk metric if perway condition is indeed sensi-
tive to risk variation. The power law model for Maitland provides a better ﬁt
to observed data and a large error exists when the log linear model is chosen
in this case. The power law model has a better correlation with TQI but does
not capture extremes for risk well. The risk value for Simonstown should be
higher, considering that it is in a state of disrepair. The sensitivity analysis
shows that model selection is important to determine accurate results.
Table 5.3: Sensitivity for risk and reliability comparison of log linear and power
law models.
Perway T@R90% T@R90% Risk Risk TQI
corridor log linear power law log linear power law average
(days) (days) (mins/day) (mins/day)
Simonstown +3.3 +6.7 23.6 11.6 19.5
Kalk Bay +7.4 +9.0 14.0 11.5 10.4
Philippi +7.0 +10.2 11.4 7.8 8.3
Maitland +4.2 +10.5 16.7 6.7 8.6
Southﬁeld +16.2 +20.1 4.6 3.7 6.4




In this chapter, a summary of the research ﬁndings, including successes and
limitations is presented. The original research problem is discussed as well as
solutions which met the set objectives for the project. Conclusions enabling
success over the research limitations are remembered as these roadblocks will
be experienced by others in the ﬁeld. The contribution of the research to
theory is mentioned so that others may not repeat advancements made. Also,
recommendations are provided to help determine who may beneﬁt from the
research outcomes and how they may use these outcomes. Finally, forward
movement on the topic is outlined and new topics that could help to improve
deteriorating infrastructure in aged railway environments are presented.
6.1 Back to the research problem
Are there any maintenance tools that quantify the risk and reliability of a
section of perway for the sake of maintenance prioritisation in the South
African passenger railway industry? The stated research problem was an-
swered through the creation of a reliability-based risk matrix decision support
tool, which grades perway corridors between train stations according to the
calculated risk that the corridor presents towards service delay. This tool is
eﬀective for maintenance prioritisation as it grades corridors into four risk cat-
egories as well as providing an ordered list which describes which corridors
are in urgent need of maintenance, compared to others. In fulﬁlment of the
strategy, the following objectives were met, so as to overcome the research
problem:
 To construct a reliability model representing the probability of successful
operation of the train service from the perspective of a section of perway
and populate the model using quantitative statistical failure data. A reli-
ability model for perway was selected after deciding between component
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level or asset level for analysis. Failure data was extracted for perway
corridors and trends were sought for data, consulting repairable system
reliability. Point process models were selected for corridors, supported by
goodness of ﬁt methods. Reliability was calculated for each system from
the end of recorded failure history using the model platforms provided.
 To create a reliability-based risk model that compares the risk of severe
service-stopping failures of diﬀerent perway sections for the purpose of
perway section maintenance prioritisation. Failure modes for perway
were identiﬁed from a FMECA. Operations reports on each failure mode
were consulted to obtain estimates for average network delay. An expert
in the ﬁeld of railway perway was consulted to adjust delay estimates
for accuracy. Failure data was used to generate reliability for perway
corridors as the likelihood component of a risk matrix. The severity
component of the risk matrix is the average network delay from each
perway corridor. Maintenance prioritisation is possible from this model
due to risk categories as well as the order of criticality, according to risk
metrics.
 To validate the developed reliability-based risk model by comparing it to
an appropriate condition-based tool currently used to make maintenance
decisions. Data for the condition-based tool was available for perway
corridors. This TQI statistic provided a condition evaluation of each
perway corridor. For each perway corridor, the calculated risk metric
was compared to the TQI statistic and a correlation existed between the
TQI and risk range for corridors. This correlation validates the relation
between one risk measure and another, ensuring that the priority order
of risk metrics is accurate. Maintenance decisions made from TQI values
were similar to those made from risk metrics.
6.2 Theoretical contribution and practical
application of methods
The researcher created new models and methodologies during the research
process that are documented. These new models and methodologies are, no-
tably, a reliability block diagram for reliability analysis of short sections of
perway; literature on the comparison between TQI and perway reliability; a
FMECA methodology as well as an FTA methodology. A summary has been
provided for the step-by-step application of repairable system reliability meth-
ods to ﬁt NHPP models to systems. No concise literature has been presented
on this topic, although none can surpass the mastery of Ascher and Feingold
(1984). A perway corridor reliability model was created, which takes into ac-
count train traﬃc decisions. A decision support risk matrix was created which
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aids perway maintenance decisions, to be used in conjunction with TQI. These
contributions are made available to help those involved with engineering asset
management and statistical reliability analysis.
In practise, maintenance information pertaining to assets is logged into an
asset management database called Empac within the PRASA environment.
This software tags assets, keeps tabs on disposals and facilitates ordering of
new parts. To plan maintenance based on this data, the data has to be ex-
tracted from the database in raw form and statistical analysis needs to be con-
ducted by an individual. The developed risk matrix is helpful because it is an
output for statistical data that otherwise might not have been used accurately
to make decisions. It is not in itself a complete maintenance management tool
but it does present a visual understanding of the state of the assets. Cost sav-
ing and exact reliability improvement is not yet quantiﬁable from the matrix
and these depend on the decisions that personnel make when using the matrix.
The developed risk matrix is applicable to a condition-based maintenance
environment where scheduling is ordered by queues, ranked according to pri-
ority. The risk metric for each perway corridor enables this queuing to take
place. Preventative maintenance tasks for perway are prioritised by risk cat-
egory from the risk matrix and the order of the risk metric is secondarily
considered to determine priority. As perway maintenance decisions are com-
plex, information provides grounds for better decisions to be made. The risk
matrix and failure history for perway provides additional but concise informa-
tion so that more informed maintenance decisions can be made.
6.3 Conclusions about limiting factors
encountered
The relationship between reliability and maintenance has not been well quanti-
ﬁed in literature. Maintenance obviously aﬀects system reliability but it seems
to be very diﬃcult to separate this eﬀect from the performance of a system.
For now, we assume that a system is combined with its past maintenance
decisions and any decision made over and above previous decisions can im-
prove the reliability by a quantiﬁable amount. It is convenient to assume that
sparse maintenance events have not aﬀected system reliability much. As a
pro-active strategy to improve maintenance, it is suggested that maintenance
is conducted on a cluster of components so that the improvement of reliability
can be quantiﬁed in the system. Suggested further research may enable man-
agement of reliability levels through speciﬁc maintenance tasks.
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Reliability analysis is limited by the number of failures available for a sys-
tem. Some long lasting components in other industries will, therefore, never
have data available for the sake of analysis. These limiting factors were par-
ticularly prevalent in PRASA's maintenance environment as they limit the
development of even better reliability models. The way to get around this
problem is accurate data-recording and the availability of ample data for a
system. For instance, if the condition of every sleeper was known for an entire
perway network then failures and reliability could be quantiﬁed in an entirely
new way. In conclusion, there is currently suﬃcient data available to populate
the developed model, but with more data, new methods can be established to
improve reliability predictions.
As the cost of train delay has many diﬀerent interpretations including cus-
tomer satisfaction, it is diﬃcult to calculate. To reduce train delay is to im-
prove asset up-time, which indicates that assets are being restored. The risk
matrix does not necessarily reduce cost but encourages maintenance expen-
diture in an intelligent way, so that a ﬁnancial backlog does not occur. This
saves PRASA from an increasingly deteriorating asset ﬂeet. The developed
risk matrix is limited to theoretical application at this stage. For it to be used
in a practical maintenance environment, the research methodology would have
to be applied to many more assets on data from other sources to PRASA.
If this was completed, the risk matrix would be able to instruct maintenance
managers where it is most beneﬁcial to allocate pre-deﬁned resources. In ad-
dition, it could encourage increased expenditures when the current state of
the perway network is critical in relation to desired reliability performance
measures.
6.4 Future work
The research topic opens up a myriad of future research avenues to further the
railway industry as well as statistical and asset management domains. The
topic itself can be extended such that its application is in-line with future
technology and problems can be solved in similar domains by applying the
same methods.
6.4.1 Extending the research topic
Research has now been conducted on the quantiﬁcation of reliability in the
rolling stock (Conradie, 2015) and perway domains in the railway industry.
Research needs to be extended to telecommunications and electrical domains
within railway infrastructure so that reliability can be synergised through dif-
ferent interfaces of the railway service. Another extension of the presented
research is the application of optimisation methods for the geographical place-
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ment of maintenance crews. Operations research methods should be applied
to improve route options for perway maintenance equipment to realise priority
maintenance activities at the lowest cost.
6.4.2 New research avenues
The application of big data to the maintenance environments in the railway
industry is a topic that the researcher feels has not yet been considered in
literature. As data capturing becomes increasingly easier as a result of the
decreasing cost of sensors and the enormous storage capacity and processing
power of modern computers, it is important that data is essentially captured
and eﬀectively used. Big data removes the level of expertise that comes with
standard data capture and makes so much information available that the ma-
nipulation of data is not required if one is to have a good picture of the observed
environment. Training everyone to analyse data well in the railway environ-
ment would be impossible. Conversely, capturing data intelligently, with visual
outputs, would give laymen tools to understand the state of their assets.
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FMEA Tables
A risk priority number is comprised of occurrence, severity and detection mea-
sures. Three tables are presented which are necessary to determine risk priority
in an FMECA, namely Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Table A.1: FMEA occurrence evaluation (Chin et al., 2009), (Xu et al., 2002).
Occurrence Likelihood of Failure rate (average for Ranking
evaluation failure 5 year period in
criteria Western Cape Region)
Very high Persistent failures 0.2 or more 10
0.1 9
High Frequent failures 0.05 8
0.02 7
Moderate Occasional failures 0.01 6
0.005 5
Low Relatively few failures 0.002 4
0.001 3
Remote Failure is unlikely 0.0005 2
0.0002 1
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Table A.2: FMEA severity evaluation (Chin et al., 2009), (Xu et al., 2002).
Severity evaulation Outage (Average delay minutes Ranking
criteria per incident)
Extremely disrupting More than 320 minutes 10
Very disrupting More than 160 minutes 9
Very high More than 80 minutes 8
High More than 40 minutes 7
Moderate More than 20 minutes 6
Low More than 10 minutes 5
Very low More than 5 minutes 4
Minor More than 2 minutes 3
Very minor More than 1 minutes 2
None No discernible eﬀect 1
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Table A.3: FMEA detection evaluation (Chin et al., 2009), (Xu et al., 2002).
Detection Description Ranking
Not detectable The risk is not detectable by existing 10
control mechanisms in the system.
Almost undetectable The risk is almost undetectable by existing 9
control mechanisms in the system.
Very low There is very low chance that the risk is 8
detected by existing system.
Low There is low chance that the risk is 7
detected by existing system.
Moderately low There is moderately low chance that the 6
risk is detected by existing system.
Moderate There is 50-50 chance that the risk is 5
detected by existing system.
Moderately high There is moderately high chance that the 4
risk is detected by existing system.
High There is high chance that the risk is 3
detected by existing system.
Very high There is a very high chance that the risk 2
is detected by existing system.
Deﬁnitely detectable The risk is deﬁnitely detectable by existing 1
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Fault Trees for Top Ten Failure
Modes
A fault tree analysis was conducted on perway failure modes. Fault trees for
nine of the ten most critical fault trees are presented here, while the rail break
fault tree is presented in the main body of the document. The rail clip failure
mode is one of the ten critical failure modes but it is not presented as its root
cause is captured in the rail break fault tree. The same situation exists for the
skid mark failure mode. Fault trees are presented in B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5,
B.6, B.7, B.8.
Figure B.1: Fault tree for rail clip failure mode.
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Figure B.2: Fault tree for sand on tracks failure mode.
Figure B.3: Fault tree for track geometry twist failure mode.
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Figure B.4: Fault tree for block joint failure mode.
Figure B.5: Fault tree for railway crossing failure mode.
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Figure B.6: Fault tree for track geometry horizontal alignment failure mode.
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Figure B.7: Fault tree for rail crown failure mode.
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Figure B.8: Fault tree for dirty ballast failure mode.
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Cumulative Failure Against Time
for Five Perway Corridors
Cumulative failure against time graphs for four of the ﬁve perway corridors
that were analysed in the main text are presented. Log linear and power law
ﬁts are included, as well as R2 goodness of ﬁt values. The ﬁts are presented
in Fig. C.1, C.2, C.3 and C.4. Table C.1 presents R2 values for log linear and
power law ﬁts.
Figure C.1: Cumulative failure against time for the Kalk Bay - Fish Hoek perway
corridor.
106
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. CUMULATIVE FAILURE AGAINST TIME FOR FIVE
PERWAY CORRIDORS 107
Figure C.2: Cumulative failure against time for the Philippi - Nyanga perway
corridor.
Figure C.3: Cumulative failure against time for the Maitland - Ndabeni perway
corridor.
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Figure C.4: Cumulative failure against time for the Southﬁeld - Heathﬁeld perway
corridor.
Table C.1: Sensitivity for risk and reliability comparison of log linear and power
law models.
Perway R2 R2
corridor log linear (%) power law (%)
Simonstown - Glencairn 94.2 89.8
Kalk Bay - Fish Hoek 97.2 94.5
Philippi - Nyanga 98.5 99.2
Maitland - Ndabeni 81.8 87.3
Southﬁeld - Heathﬁeld 97.1 96.1
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Linear Estimation Method for
Five Perway Corridors
A linear estimation method by Crowder et al. (1994) is applied to ﬁve perway
corridors in support of R2 goodness of ﬁt values. These curves are presented
in Fig. D.1, D.2, D.3 and D.4.
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Figure D.1: Estimated ROCOF for Kalk Bay a) log linear and b) power law models
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Figure D.2: Estimated ROCOF for Philippi a) log linear and b) power law models
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Figure D.3: Estimated ROCOF for Maitland a) log linear and b) power law models
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Figure D.4: Estimated ROCOF for Southﬁeld a) log linear and b) power law models
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Conﬁdence Bounds on ROCOF for
Five Perway Corridors
95% Conﬁdence bounds are placed around the ROCOF for ﬁve perway cor-
ridors. Conﬁdence bounds are plotted for log linear and power law models,
namely Fig. E.1, E.2, E.3 and E.4.
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Figure E.1: ROCOF of the Kalk Bay perway corridor with 95% upper and lower
conﬁdence bounds for a) log linear and b) power law models.
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Figure E.2: ROCOF of the Philippi perway corridor with 95% upper and lower
conﬁdence bounds for a) log linear and b) power law models.
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Figure E.3: ROCOF of the Maitland perway corridor with 95% upper and lower
conﬁdence bounds for a) log linear and b) power law models.
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Figure E.4: ROCOF of the Southﬁeld perway corridor with 95% upper and lower
conﬁdence bounds for a) log linear and b) power law models.
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Appendix F
Urban Transport 2015 Conference
Article
In June 2015, Mark attended the Urban Transport 2015 Conference in Va-
lencia, Spain along with a colleague from the PRASA Engineering Research
Chair. Mark presented a topic related to reliability in the railway perway con-
text to an international audience. His paper has been published in the Urban
Transport 2015 proceedings and the article can be found on Google Scholar.
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Appendix G
South African Journal of
Industrial Engineering Article
In March 2015, Mark attended the CIRP 25th Design Conference in Haifa,
Israel. He presented his work on reliability centred perway maintenance tools
and received useful input from members of the Technion Haifa, as well as
international attendees. Among those presenting at the conference was The
vice-president of research for General Motors and a member of the engineering
team from the 'Iron Dome' missile defence project. Mark's article was submit-
ted to the South African Journal of Industrial Engineering and was accepted.
The article is in the pre-publication editing process.
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